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I. INTRODUCTION
In J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, the Dark Lord Sauron
created the One Ring to enslave the leaders of the elves, dwarves, and
humans.1 On it, Sauron inscribed the latter half of this poetic warn-
ing: “One ring to rule them all, one ring to find them; One ring to bring
them all and in the darkness bind them.”2 The intergovernmental tax
system proposed here for the United States might well be described in
the same way—one federal-level tax structure to “rule” (and largely
replace) the fifty states’ current tax structures. Because the proposed
structure is centralized, it would better “find” multi-state taxpayers
and it would more efficiently and effectively “bring” and “bind” their
corresponding tax bases (e.g., taxable income) before converting those
bases into tax revenue that would feed expenditures at the federal and
state government levels.3 To develop and support that proposal, this
Article revisits fiscal federalism’s tax-assignment problem using tradi-
tional tax policy considerations and with an eye toward reevaluating
the conventional wisdom disfavoring centralized taxation in light of
recent developments in the field of behavioral economics.4
Broadly speaking, fiscal federalism deals with “the vertical struc-
ture of the public sector” in order to “align[ ] responsibilities and fiscal
instruments with the proper levels of government.”5 Taxes are one of
those fiscal instruments, making the tax-assignment problem one as-
pect of the broader fiscal federalism dynamic.6 In short, the tax-as-
signment problem addresses the assignment of taxing power and
specific taxes to the proper level of government in a federal system.7
While there are numerous other fiscal federalism issues (e.g., expendi-
1. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 49 (Houghton Mifflin ed., Harper Collins
Publishers 2004) (1994).
2. Id.
3. Depending on one’s views on the usefulness of government programs, the “dark-
ness” part might apply to the proposal as well. As President Ronald Reagan once
observed: “[T]he nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from
the Government, and I’m here to help.” Ronald Reagan, The President’s News
Conference: August 12, 1986, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=37733&st=&st1= [http://perma.unl.edu/K697-
8DVJ]. This Article does not take a position on what the proper level of govern-
ment spending should be, instead focusing on how best to raise the needed reve-
nue after those spending decisions are made.
4. One of the first behavioral economists described the field as “economics done with
strong injections of good psychology and other social sciences.” RICHARD H. THA-
LER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 9 (2015).
5. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120,
1120 (1999) [hereinafter Oates, Essay].
6. John Norregaard, Tax Assignment, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 49, 49 (Teresa Ter-Minassian ed., 1997).
7. Richard A. Musgrave, Who Should Tax, Where, and What?, in TAX ASSIGNMENT IN
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2, 11–13 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1983).
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ture assignment and budgetary management in a federal system),8
this Article focuses almost exclusively on the tax-assignment problem
and only implicates those other issues when necessary to further the
tax-assignment discussion.
At bottom, the proper assignment of taxes among the federal gov-
ernment and the fifty state governments is driven by the tradeoff be-
tween the benefits of having a centralized, uniform tax system and
those created by intergovernmental tax competition in a decentralized
system. The current U.S. system has centralized and decentralized as-
pects but tilts heavily toward the latter approach. Thus, each state is
free to impose taxes that overlap with federal taxes (e.g., business in-
come taxes) or target completely different tax bases (e.g., general sales
taxes and property taxes).9 The resulting mix of state and federal
taxes creates a number of problems that are summarized here and
explored in greater detail later. First, taxpayers are encouraged to re-
duce their aggregate state tax liability by rearranging activities to
take advantage of variations in state taxing systems. More aggressive
taxpayers may even lobby state legislators to create such tax-reducing
variations in exchange for the taxpayers’ agreement to move their eco-
nomic activities into the state in question. Neither of these taxpayer
behaviors is desirable because each involves a tax-driven distortion of
the taxpayer’s pre-tax activities that may result in suboptimal re-
source allocations. Second, the presence of fifty-one separate tax sys-
tems in the United States greatly increases aggregate tax
administration costs for taxpayers and taxing authorities. For taxpay-
ers, that lack of uniformity means more time and money spent prepar-
ing multiple tax returns, trying to understand multiple sets of tax
rules, and planning to legally reduce their total taxes by navigating
those rules. While the fifty-one federal and state tax administrators
may be individually quite cost-effective, in the aggregate the parallel
administrative operations needed to enforce their non-uniform tax
systems are not. Finally, the lack of uniformity can create inequitable
results among U.S. taxpayers because uneven tax systems will inevi-
tably cause some similarly situated taxpayers to pay different tax
amounts for no good reason. Furthermore, in the business arena, the
uneven tax treatment from non-uniform tax systems can unfairly cre-
ate competitive advantages that favor one business over another.
Clearly, whatever the benefits of intergovernmental tax competition
are, the costs of a decentralized tax system in the United States are
considerable.
8. For a more comprehensive fiscal federalism discussion, see, for example, FISCAL
FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 6.
9. See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407,
420 (2010) (providing an overview of the mix of various taxes that the states use
to raise revenue).
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Because there is ample reason to believe that those competition
benefits are dwarfed by the costs outlined above, this Article proposes
revising the United States’ current multitiered taxation system to con-
solidate most taxing power at the federal level and to replace most
state and local taxes with unconditional intergovernmental transfers
that are funded out of the incremental federal-level taxes. Only real
property taxes and license taxes would remain with the state govern-
ments. Note that, although one could certainly argue that the mix of
taxes used in the United States could be improved,10 this proposal ig-
nores that separate and distinct issue by simply assuming that the
current mix of state taxes will be consolidated with existing federal
taxes (e.g., income taxes) or relocated to the federal level (e.g., sales
taxes), as appropriate. From a tax-assignment perspective, this cen-
tralization is intended to improve the efficiency, cost effectiveness,
and fairness of the overall tax system by increasing uniformity.
The remainder of the proposal is intended to preserve, to the ex-
tent possible, the benefits of decentralized government despite the
newly centralized tax system. The broader fiscal federalism literature
supports the conclusion that decisions regarding public goods and
other governmental benefits should be made at the lowest level of gov-
ernment encompassing the benefit in question. Decentralizing these
expenditure decisions should lead to the best alignment between a
government’s benefits and its residents’ preferences for those bene-
fits.11 Thus, the proposed system retains the existing level of state and
local expenditure decision-making to preserve that narrowly tailored
fit of government benefits to the residents’ preferences. The funds
needed by the states to provide those benefits would come from uncon-
ditional intergovernmental transfers, maximizing the states’ ability to
customize governmental benefits without federal government interfer-
ence.12 While the U.S. Congress would retain the power to adjust the
magnitude of those transfers, ideally the transfers should be fixed at
constant amounts to increase the states’ revenue stability and to bet-
ter shield their provision of governmental benefits from localized eco-
nomic ebbs and flows. Of course, the federal government would
continue to provide its own set of governmental benefits (e.g., national
defense) and would also continue to exert influence over state-pro-
vided benefits through the use of conditional intergovernmental trans-
fers (e.g., matching federal funds for federally approved Medicaid
10. See, e.g., id. at 436–42 (outlining steps that the federal government could take to
“promote the adoption of more crisis-resilient state revenue structures” that de-
pend on a less volatile mix of taxes).
11. Wallace E. Oates, On the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions,
61 NAT’L TAX J. 313, 314 (2008).
12. Ehtisham Ahmad & Jon Craig, Intergovernmental Transfers, in FISCAL FEDERAL-
ISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 73, 87.
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services), just as it does under the current system.13 Thus, the current
system’s customization benefits derived from decentralized govern-
mental responsibilities are preserved and augmented by the new uni-
formity benefits derived from consolidating most taxes at the federal
level.
Taken together, this Article’s proposed mix of centralized fiscal in-
struments and decentralized government responsibilities delivers an
improved U.S. tax system while striking the right fiscal federalism
balance. Part II of this Article begins by briefly describing the United
States’ current federal and state tax system before providing a more
detailed explanation of the proposed solution to fiscal federalism’s tax-
assignment problem. It closes by examining the proposed solution’s
viability under the U.S. Constitution. Part III analyzes and compares
the proposed solution to the current system using principles drawn
from the fiscal federalism literature and traditional tax policy consid-
erations involving economic efficiency, equity, and administrative
complexity. Importantly, several key fiscal federalism objections to
centralized taxation, particularly when that approach is combined
with decentralized governmental spending, are reconsidered in light
of recent advances in the field of behavioral economics. Part III con-
cludes with the determination that the proposed solution is an im-
provement over the current system. Part IV discusses a handful of
other alternatives that are occasionally championed in the tax law and
fiscal federalism literature. Finally, this Article concludes in Part V
with the observation that, while the proposed tax-assignment solution
may be politically untenable in the United States at this time, it is
certainly worth pursuing.
II. ONE TAX SYSTEM TO RULE THEM ALL
Just as Sauron used the One Ring to impose his will on the rulers
of Middle Earth,14 the federal government would use the intergovern-
mental tax system proposed here to impose a single federal-level tax
structure in place of the fifty states’ current tax structures. Happily,
this latter imposition should improve taxation within the United
States without creating any of the dire consequences that accompa-
nied Sauron’s rule in Middle Earth.15 This Part sets the stage for the
detailed tax policy and fiscal federalism analysis that follows in Part
III by briefly describing the United States’ current federal and state
tax system and providing a more detailed explanation of the intergov-
13. ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID FINANCING AND EXPENDI-
TURES 1 (2015).
14. TOLKIEN, supra note 1, at 49–51.
15. Id. at 873 (recounting the Black Gate’s opening and the great host of Orcs that
issued from it). No burning and plundering by an Orc army are anticipated at
this time if the tax system proposed here is adopted.
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ernmental tax system that this Article proposes as a solution to fiscal
federalism’s tax-assignment problem. Because a solution that is not
legally permissible is not a solution at all, this Part closes by examin-
ing whether the proposed solution is legal under the U.S.
Constitution.
A. The Current System
Structurally, the current U.S. tax system is a web of overlapping
federal and state taxes because the U.S. Constitution, which estab-
lishes outer boundaries for the federal and state governments’ powers,
permits the federal government to impose income taxes and certain
other taxes (e.g., wealth transfer taxes) without explicitly limiting the
states’ taxing power.16 That permissiveness has led to considerable
overlap among the main federal taxes (i.e., individual income taxes,
corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, wealth transfer taxes, and ex-
cise taxes) and the main state taxes (i.e., individual income taxes, cor-
porate income taxes, payroll taxes, property taxes, general sales taxes,
selective sales taxes, license taxes, severance taxes, and wealth trans-
fer taxes).17 Thus, most types of tax imposed by the federal govern-
ment are also imposed by the states. Taking into account the partial
overlap between the federal excise taxes and states’ selective sales
taxes, only property taxes, general sales taxes, and severance taxes
are exclusively imposed at one level of government.18
The magnitude of each category of federal and state taxes is shown
in Table 1 for fiscal year 2015:19
16. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (permitting federal excise taxes); id. amend. XVI
(permitting federal income taxes); id. amend. X (reserving unaddressed powers to
the states and the people).
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (tabulating federal and state revenue
contributions from various types of taxes).
18. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
19. The federal tax revenue data shown in Table 1 is taken from DEP’T OF THE TREA-
SURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND BALANCES OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2016), https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/
rpt/combStmt/cs2015/receipt.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RK3Y-Z6LY]. With the
exception of the property tax data, the aggregate state tax revenue data is taken
from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY OF STATE GOVERNMENT TAX
COLLECTIONS (2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchre
sults.xhtml?refresh=t (follow the link to the Bureau’s website and copy and paste
the “2015 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections” into the search
bar). Property tax data for the twelve months ending June 30, 2015, is taken from
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE & LOCAL TAX REVENUE
tbls.1, 2 (2017), http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/. Complete data is not yet avail-
able for fiscal year 2016.
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Table 1: Comparison of FY2015 Federal and State and Local Tax
Revenues by Category (Amounts in billions)(a)
Tax Category Federal States
Income Taxes
Individual $1,540.8 $338.1
Corporate 343.8 49.1
Payroll Taxes 1,065.3 (b)
Property Taxes
State 15.1
Local 489.3
Sales Taxes
General 286.2
Selective 145.1
Excise Taxes 98.3
License Taxes 52.2
Severance Taxes 12.6
Wealth Transfer Taxes 19.2 4.8
Miscellaneous Taxes 181.4 10.9
Total FY2015 Tax Revenue $3,248.8 $1,403.4
Notes:
(a) FY2015 ended on 9/30/2015 for the federal government and on 6/30/2015 for
most state governments.
(b) Omitted because the most recent payroll tax data available for the states is
from FY2014.
As noted in Table 1, payroll tax data is not yet available from the
United States Census Bureau for the states’ fiscal year 2015. How-
ever, the most recent data from fiscal year 2014 shows that the states’
main payroll taxes, which cover unemployment compensation and
workers’ compensation, were $62.3 billion and $15.2 billion, respec-
tively.20 Assuming that a similar amount of state payroll taxes was
collected in fiscal year 2015, federal tax revenues were approximately
two times the aggregate state and local tax revenues for that year.21
Furthermore, more than 48% of all federal and state tax revenue came
from income taxes.22 When payroll taxes and sales taxes (including
excise taxes) are combined with income taxes, they represent more
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES BY LEVEL OF
GOVERNMENT AND BY STATE: 2014 tbl.LF1400A1 (2017), http://factfinder.census
.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=SLF_2014_00A1&prod
Type=table.
21. As shown in Table 1, federal tax revenue for fiscal year 2015 was $3248.8 billion.
After inclusion of the estimated $77.5 billion in payroll taxes, the aggregate state
and local tax revenue from Table 1 becomes $1480.9 billion. Therefore, federal
tax revenues were 2.19 times larger than state and local tax revenues.
22. As shown in Table 1, total tax revenue for fiscal year 2015 was $4652.2 billion.
The total income taxes at all levels of government for fiscal year 2015 were
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than 80% of all federal and state tax revenue.23 With the exception of
sales taxes, the bulk of those taxes are federal.
By necessity, each of these federal and state taxes is accompanied
by a separate tax compliance process and administration. For exam-
ple, in fiscal year 2014 the federal government and forty-three states
administered an individual income tax.24 Forty-five states and the
federal government administered a corporate income tax in that fiscal
year.25 Although the federal government does not have a general sales
tax, taxpayers still faced forty-five separate state general sales tax re-
gimes and taxing authorities.26 The problem is compounded for selec-
tive sales taxes (including excise taxes) because numerous distinct
sales taxes are covered by that term.27 Clearly, the United States’ cur-
rent tax system quickly becomes quite complex for taxpayers with con-
nections to more than one or two states.
Once the respective levels of government have harvested the tax
revenue, an intricate set of intergovernmental transfers from the fed-
eral government to the state governments begins. In fiscal year 2014,
federal grants to state and local governments totaled $576.9 billion.28
That money was spread over 1078 categorical grants and twenty-one
block grants.29 Categorical grants “can be used only for a specifically
aided program and usually are limited to narrowly defined activi-
ties.”30 The twenty-one block grants were also targeted at specifically
aided programs, but they gave the recipient state government signifi-
cantly more discretion over how to go about meeting the programs’
objectives.31 Despite that difference in the level of federal oversight,
block grants and categorical grants are conditional transfers because
their receipt is conditioned upon each state government’s agreement
to use the transferred funds for a particular purpose.32 Unconditional
intergovernmental transfers, which leave each state free to use the
$2271.8 billion. Therefore, approximately 48.8% of total tax revenue came from
income taxes.
23. The sum of all income, payroll, sales, and excise taxes in Table 1 equals $3866.7
billion. That amount is 83.1% of the $4652.2 billion total tax revenue for fiscal
year 2015. If property taxes, which will not be touched by the proposed federal
consolidation, are excluded, then income, payroll, sales, and excise taxes exceed
93% of total tax revenue.
24. CHERYL LEE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS
SUMMARY REPORT: 2014, at 3 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LO-
CAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 5 tbl.2
(2015). The estimate for fiscal year 2015 is $628 billion. Id.
29. Id. at 10 tbl.4.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Ahmad & Craig, supra note 12, at 86–87.
2017] ONE TAX TO RULE THEM ALL 9
transferred funds to tailor its governmental benefits to its residents’
preferences, were not used in the United States in fiscal year 2014.33
Thus, the current U.S. system of intergovernmental transfers largely
serves to promote federal government policy objectives at the state
level and to correct fiscal imbalances arising when the states accept
responsibility for administering the resulting federal programs but
lack the revenue on their own to fund the increased expenditures re-
sulting from those programs.34
Finally, the federal and state governments spend money to provide
governmental benefits. At the federal level, some of those governmen-
tal benefits are acquired by the federal government directly (e.g., na-
tional defense, national parks, and the regulation of interstate
commerce).35 As discussed immediately above, others are acquired in-
directly by exerting influence over state-provided benefits through the
use of conditional intergovernmental transfers (e.g., health, income
security, and transportation).36 In addition, each state uses its own
tax revenue to acquire governmental benefits that are locally custom-
ized to fit the preferences of its residents (e.g., public education and
corrections).37 The resulting mix of benefits can be difficult to untan-
gle if residents wish to trace a specific benefit back to the government
officials who are ultimately responsible for it. Under the current U.S.
system, deciding whether each level of government provides govern-
mental benefits that are commensurate with the taxes it imposes, and
the intergovernmental transfers that it receives, is even more difficult.
B. The Proposed System
This Article’s solution to the tax-assignment problem for the
United States is designed to improve the intergovernmental tax sys-
tem’s performance without negatively impacting the federal and state
governments’ ability to provide governmental benefits to their re-
sidents. That outcome will be achieved by two steps. First, the tax sys-
tem’s uniformity will be increased through consolidation of most
taxing power at the federal level. Second, the federal government will
replace the current state taxes with unconditional intergovernmental
33. DILGER, supra note 28, at 10 tbl.4. Dilger refers to unconditional transfers as
general revenue sharing grants in Table 4.
34. In the language of fiscal federalism, this sort of fiscal imbalance, or gap, between
revenue at one level and expenditure requirements at another level is called a
“vertical imbalance.” Ahmad & Craig, supra note 12, at 74–76. In contrast, “hori-
zontal imbalances” arise when different states provide differing levels of govern-
mental benefits to federal residents. Id. at 76.
35. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/
rpt/combStmt/cs2015/outlay.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6SNS-B467].
36. DILGER, supra note 28, at 6 fig.1.
37. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING
FISCAL 2013–2015 STATE SPENDING 2–4 (2015).
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transfers that are funded out of the incremental federal-level taxes.
That approach will leave largely undisturbed the states’ ability to pro-
vide governmental benefits that are locally customized to fit the pref-
erences of its residents.
1. Tax Assignment
Properly dividing taxing power between the federal and state
levels of government is a critical part of optimizing governmental per-
formance in a federal system.38 Fiscal federalism scholars often clas-
sify taxes as benefit or nonbenefit taxes depending on whether the tax
in question is directly related to receipt of a specific governmental
benefit.39 The states’ license taxes shown in Table 1 are a benefit tax
because only people who acquire a license from the state pay the tax
(e.g., a license to sell liquor).40 Income taxes and sales taxes are clas-
sic examples of nonbenefit taxes.41 Consistent with the general fiscal
federalism principle of assigning taxes and expenditures to the lowest
level of government that fully encompasses the resulting benefit, econ-
omists usually recommend assigning benefit taxes to the government
providing the related benefit.42 Although other factors are considered
when assigning nonbenefit taxes, they tend to be assigned to higher,
more centralized, levels of government.43
The tax-assignment approach advocated here is mostly consistent
with those general principles. The main nonbenefit taxes—income
taxes (individual and corporate), payroll taxes,44 sales taxes (general
and selective), severance taxes, and wealth transfer taxes—are as-
signed to the federal government. As a benefit tax, license taxes re-
main state-level taxes. For the reasons outlined more clearly below,
real property taxes also remain state-level taxes.45 To prevent the
38. S Gurumurthi, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Three Faces of Tax Sharing—
I, 33 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2301, 2301 (1998).
39. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1125.
40. See Gurumurthi, supra note 38, at 2307.
41. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes—and the Nutti-
ness of Responses Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 841, 842 (2002) [hereinafter McLure,
The Nuttiness] (noting that “sales taxes on business purchases and corporate in-
come taxes” are taxes “that do not reflect benefits of public services provided to
the taxpayer”).
42. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1120.
43. Id. at 1125–26.
44. Although payroll tax payments may result in the receipt of future governmental
benefits, like Social Security payments, they are arguably nonbenefit taxes be-
cause “the relationship may be weak between tax payments and services pro-
vided.” Norregaard, supra note 6, at 67–68.
45. Although the reasons for the special treatment of real property taxes are dis-
cussed further below, it is worth noting that some fiscal federalism scholars as-
sert that such taxes are actually benefit taxes. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at
1126 n.11. That dispute classification suggests that keeping real property taxes
at the state level (i.e., the lowest level fully encompassing the real property and
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states from undermining the federal government’s sole claim to the
taxes assigned to it, Congress will issue legislation using its Com-
merce Clause authority that preempts the states’ ability to regulate
interstate commerce through taxation (other than license and real
property taxation). The expected benefits obtained through this tax
centralization approach are discussed in Part III.
There is one determinative reason why real property taxes are the
only nonbenefit taxes retained at the state level, and there are three
additional reasons why that result is a good idea. The determinative
reason is that a federal property tax would be unconstitutional be-
cause, as a direct tax,46 it must be apportioned by population instead
of property value.47 The additional reasons are almost as compelling.
First, centralization of real property taxes at the federal level would
not simplify tax administration because real property is already only
taxed once by the state containing it48 and because the tax’s main
source of conflict is determining the real property’s value, a factual
dispute that would not be affected if a uniform federal system of real
property taxes replaced the current state tax systems.49 Second, real
property cannot be picked up and moved to a different state. So, tax-
ing it does not encourage tax avoidance techniques that reduce the
tax’s ability to raise revenue and that distort taxpayer behavior in
pursuit of tax minimization.50 Third, leaving real property taxation at
the state level preserves some state-level control over revenue, which
would allow each state to increase the level of governmental benefits
provided by that state to its residents if that increase comports with
its residents’ preference for those benefits. Real property taxes are a
natural fit here because they are typically used to provide localized
governmental benefits like education51 and because, compared to
many of the other types of taxes, they are a fairly stable revenue
source that can provide steady support for those benefits.52
Simply reassigning current state-level taxes to the federal govern-
ment isolates the tax-assignment problem from the question of
the governmental benefits accorded to it) is consistent with the broader fiscal
federalism policy discussed above.
46. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570–71 (2012) (recounting the
history of the Supreme Court’s direct tax definition).
47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken.”).
48. See supra Table 1 (reporting that property taxes are only collected by state and
local governments).
49. FERDINAND P. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE LAW AND POLICY OF
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION 54–55 (2003).
50. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 895, 913 (1992).
51. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 423 (3d ed. 2000).
52. Stark, supra note 9, at 422–23.
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whether the current mix of taxes used in the United States is optimal.
The specific approach necessary to carry out that reassignment de-
pends on the particular tax involved. For example, state income taxes
would simply fold into the existing federal income tax system. While
that change would be significant for taxpayers in states that do not
use an income tax, or ones whose tax base deviates significantly from
federal taxable income, the change would not require an adjustment
to the federal tax base.53 Only the marginal tax rates applied to that
tax base would need adjustment so that federal taxes generate enough
revenue to replace the eliminated state income taxes. For taxes that
do not exist at the federal level, like the states’ general sales tax, Con-
gress would create a federal version.54 Presumably, the new federal
general sales tax would employ the same general mix of taxable trans-
actions and exemptions currently used in the majority of states.55 The
new general sales tax rate would then be set at the level needed to
replace the states’ aggregate general sales tax revenue.
While restructuring the U.S. tax system in this manner would in-
volve many new statutory provisions and important policy decisions,
most of those details are not necessary to understand and analyze the
tax-assignment problem. However, the fate of Internal Revenue Code
section 164 is relevant because that section has direct fiscal federal-
ism consequences.56 Section 164 permits federal income taxpayers to
deduct various state and local taxes, including real property taxes,57
personal property taxes,58 income taxes,59 and general sales taxes60
when calculating their federal taxable income. Other state-level taxes
are deductible if they are part of a trade or business or are connected
to the production of income.61 Those federal income tax deductions ef-
fectively act as an indirect transfer from the federal government to the
state governments by reducing the amount of income tax collected by
the federal government and permitting the states to increase tax col-
lections without imposing the full cost of the additional taxes on their
53. In fiscal year 2014, seven states did not employ an individual income tax, and five
states did not have a corporate income tax. LEE ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
54. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsre-
ports/rpt/combStmt/cs2015/receipt.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RK3Y-Z6LY]
(showing no federal general sales tax revenue for fiscal year 2015).
55. For example, the majority of states exempt groceries from sales tax, and some
also exempt clothing. SCOTT DRENKARD & JARED WALCZAK, TAX FOUND., STATE
AND LOCAL SALES TAX RATES IN 2015, at 5 (2015).
56. See Stark, supra note 9, at 425–27 (observing that the favorable federal income
tax deductibility awarded to some state taxes, but not others, influences state
taxation decisions).
57. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (2017).
58. § 164(a)(2).
59. § 164(a)(3).
60. § 164(b)(5)(A).
61. § 164(a).
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residents.62 At minimum, the portions of section 164 dealing with
state income taxes and general sales taxes should be repealed with the
elimination of those taxes. Because federal taxes are not deductible,63
the federal-level replacement taxes would not reduce taxpayers’ fed-
eral income taxes. Ideally, Congress would also repeal the section 164
deduction for all state taxes, including property taxes and those con-
nected to trade or business activity, because the resulting indirect in-
tergovernmental transfer is difficult for voters to monitor or reject.64
If Congress determined that the states needed funds to replace these
indirect section 164 transfers, it could authorize direct intergovern-
mental transfers in their place that would be more transparent to
voters.
2. Intergovernmental Transfers
Stripping the states of most taxing authority, while leaving them
responsible for providing governmental benefits, creates an intergov-
ernmental misalignment of revenue and expenditure needs. The two
main approaches to closing that fiscal gap are intergovernmental
transfers from the federal government to the states and tax-revenue
sharing between those two levels of government.65 The primary differ-
ence between these two approaches is that the former are not necessa-
rily tied to tax revenue while the latter’s flow of funds, from the
federal government to the states, fluctuates with changes in tax reve-
nue.66 Because providing a steady stream of revenue to the state gov-
ernments should supply steady support for the states’ governmental
benefits, intergovernmental transfers are preferred over tax-revenue
sharing.
Using intergovernmental transfers that are fixed in amount and
stable improves on the existing model of state-tax financed govern-
mental benefits by assigning the financing function to the level of gov-
ernment that is most capable of managing the risk of changes in the
amount of taxes collected due to economic fluctuations (e.g., business
62. See Stark, supra note 9, at 425–27 (explaining how the federal subsidy to state
taxpayers scales with those taxpayers’ federal marginal tax rates, which has nud-
ged the states to build progressive tax systems that try to capture larger federal
subsidies).
63. I.R.C. § 275(a)(1)–(3), (5)–(6) (2017).
64. This step would have the additional side benefit of simplifying compliance for
some individual federal income taxpayers because eliminating the state tax de-
duction would push more of them into using the standard deduction. As a result,
those taxpayers would not need to track, claim, or substantiate other itemized
deductions. See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2017) (giving individuals a choice between the
standard deduction and itemized deductions).
65. Teresa Ter-Minassian, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in a Macroeconomic
Perspective: An Overview, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 6, at 3, 11–15.
66. Id.
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cycles). Unlike the individual states, which can only raise tax revenue
from their separate tax bases, the federal government raises tax reve-
nue from a tax base that includes all the states and therefore repre-
sents a diversified portfolio of state tax bases. State-specific economic
downturns that would present revenue-raising issues for the states
involved are smoothed out by offsetting revenue increases from other
states that are experiencing economic growth. When that diversifica-
tion protection fails, the federal government’s superior borrowing
power, when compared to the states, and its ability to print money
enable it to more efficiently and inexpensively cover the resulting
budgetary shortfall.67 Given debt’s relative importance to the financ-
ing of governmental benefits during the recent economic downturn,68
the states and their residents would benefit from relying on the fed-
eral government’s centralized financing.
Fixing the amount of state funding through intergovernmental
transfers is likely to raise concerns that the states could lose the abil-
ity to influence their economies through expenditure adjustments.
While this concern is valid, several aspects of the proposed system
make it less likely to be a serious problem. First, each state can mod-
estly increase its tax revenue to pay for increased expenditures by ad-
67. Of the major credit rating agencies, only Standard & Poor’s assigns the United
States a credit rating that is not its highest. Even then, Standard & Poor’s AA+ is
still quite good. Alexandra Scaggs, S&P Affirms U.S. AA+ Credit Rating, Main-
tains Stable Outlook, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2015-06-10/s-p-affirms-u-s-aa-credit-rating-maintains-
stable-outlook [https://perma.unl.edu/5G4F-6UPB]. In contrast, only twenty-
eight states have an equivalent or better rating from S&P, and most of those have
had lower ratings in the past. Pamela M. Prah & Stephen C. Fehr, Infographic:
S&P State Credit Ratings, 2001–2014, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 9,
2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/
06/09/sp-ratings-2014 [https://perma.unl.edu/FW4T-5ZDB]. According to
Moody’s, only fifteen states have earned a rating matching the United States’
rating. MOODY’S INV’R SERV., RATING CHANGES FOR THE 50 STATES FROM 1970, at 2
(2015).
68. At its peak during fiscal year 2009, the deficit contributed 40.2% of total federal
outlays, and that contribution ratio stayed above 30% through fiscal year 2012.
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND
BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: 2010 COMBINED STATEMENT
(2010), https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/combStmt/cs2010/finhigh
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/9MQV-TMHQ] (reporting a deficit and outlays of
$1415.7 billion and $3520.1 billion for fiscal year 2009, and $1294.2 billion and
$3456.0 billion for fiscal year 2010); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMBINED STATE-
MENT OF RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
2012 COMBINED STATEMENT (2012), https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/
combStmt/cs2012/finhigh.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/S9T3-T8TX] (reporting a
deficit and outlays of $1296.8 billion and $3599.3 billion for fiscal year 2011, and
$1089.2 billion and $3538.3 billion for fiscal year 2012).
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justing its real property tax rates,69 which should be a fairly stable
source of additional revenue.70 Second, each state could effectively re-
duce the taxes paid by its residents by choosing to return some of the
money received from the federal government directly to its re-
sidents.71 Furthermore, a state could increase current expenditures
by borrowing against its stream of intergovernmental transfers and
using portions of subsequent transfers to repay the bonds. In these
three ways, the states would retain significant control over their an-
nual budgets despite primarily relying on intergovernmental transfers
instead of tax revenue.
Two other aspects of the intergovernmental transfers warrant dis-
cussion—their unconditional nature and the method used to allocate
the transfers among the states. In addition to being fixed in amount,
the transfers that replace the states’ tax revenue would be uncondi-
tional. Unlike conditional transfers, which require the recipient states
to use the transferred funds only for specific purposes, unconditional
transfers come with “no strings attached” and can be used by the re-
cipient states in any manner.72 Thus, while conditional transfers
would be a means for the federal government to exert control over the
states’ expenditures, unconditional transfers free each state to cus-
tomize its governmental benefits to its residents’ preferences without
federal government interference. The resulting tailored distribution of
governmental benefits should increase overall societal utility when
compared to the more uniform distribution that would arise from fed-
erally controlled conditional transfers.73 In appropriate situations
(e.g., setting minimum governmental benefit standards for all U.S. cit-
izens, dealing with problems that span multiple states, or when in-
terjurisdictional spillover benefits are present), the federal
government would continue to use conditional transfers that heavily
influence the states’ expenditure decisions toward greater national
69. This ability is not insignificant when state and local revenues are considered. See
supra Table 1 (reporting that property taxes were $504.4 billion in fiscal year
2015, or 35.9% of total state and local tax revenue).
70. See Stark, supra note 9, at 422 (summarizing the current consensus on state tax
volatility that “property taxes tend to be more stable than sales and income
taxes”).
71. While a government returning money to its residents rather than spending the
money on other governmental benefits is not common, the State of Alaska does
just that every year when it pays its Alaska Permanent Fund dividend. The
Alaska Permanent Fund’s principal comes from the state’s mineral lease income
and must be invested. ALASKA CONST. art. 9, § 15. However, its income “shall be
deposited in the general fund unless otherwise provided by law.” Id. The Alaska
legislature requires payment of a permanent fund dividend to qualifying Alas-
kans each year in an amount determined by a statutory formula. ALASKA STAT.
§§ 43.23.005, .025(a), .055(1) (2016).
72. Ter-Minassian, supra note 65, at 13–15.
73. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1121–22.
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uniformity.74 But, those conditional transfers would augment, not re-
place, the unconditional transfers discussed here.
The choice of allocation method for dividing the total intergovern-
mental transfer amount among the states will depend on whether
Congress wants to use the transfers to redistribute funds among those
states. At minimum, the factor or factors used should be objectively
measurable and hard to manipulate so that the states cannot easily
game the allocation system. The two obvious choices are allocation by
relative population and allocation by relative total tax revenue paid by
residents of each state. If population is chosen as the factor, already-
collected United States Census data could be used to calculate each
state’s allocation.75 By providing a per-capita transfer amount to each
state, the allocation system would reflect a view that each person is
entitled to an equivalent level of governmental benefits. The effect
would be redistributive because funds would shift from states with
above-average per-capita tax payments to states with below-average
per-capita tax payments.76 In practice, that redistributive shift to-
ward equal shares would be affected by cost variations in the states’
provision of governmental benefits.77 Including a regional cost-of-liv-
ing adjustment would help preserve an equal level of governmental-
benefits purchasing power per resident.78 If total tax revenue is cho-
sen as the factor, annual federal tax collections could be used to calcu-
late each state’s allocation.79 While not redistributive among the
states, because each state would get back the amount its residents
collectively paid, this approach would presumably do a better job ac-
counting for the varying costs of providing governmental benefits in
different states because higher prices and higher salaries would lead
to greater tax revenue, greater allocation factors, and greater govern-
mental-benefit costs. However, it could be more complicated to admin-
ister than a population factor because some of the taxes involved may
have ties to multiple states (e.g., the resident of one state buying
74. WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 85–94 (1972) [hereinafter OATES, FISCAL
FEDERALISM].
75. The U.S. Constitution and federal statute require the collection of population
data every ten years. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2017).
76. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 74, at 78–81.
77. Ahmad & Craig, supra note 12, at 76 (“Subnational governments differ in their
fiscal capacities . . . because the need for and the cost of providing certain services
differs among regions.”).
78. Using a regional cost-of-living adjustment is admittedly a rough approximation of
the actual cost variations involved, but it may be suitable when applied to a wide
range of benefits. For a discussion of more detailed expenditure-equalization ap-
proaches, see id. at 101–04.
79. Ter-Minassian, supra note 65, at 11. Note that “[s]haring of tax revenues can be
arranged on a tax-by-tax basis, with different coefficients of distribution among
levels of government for each tax or on the entire pool of central government tax
revenues.” Id.
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goods from a merchant in another state). Whether Congress chooses
population, total tax revenue, or some combination of those two fac-
tors is a political decision that will not affect this Article’s proposed
solution to fiscal federalism’s tax-assignment problem.
3. Expenditure Responsibility
As noted above, the intergovernmental transfers’ unconditional na-
ture would preserve the states’ current level of control over expendi-
ture decisions. Generally, that localized control over governmental
benefits should lead to a mix of benefits that satisfies the states’ re-
sidents.80 It also empowers the states to compete with each other to
attract residents and businesses by assembling a desirable benefit mix
that produces more value for residents than their accompanying tax
obligations.81 That competition could include everything from
purchasing public goods (e.g., parks and libraries) to increasing em-
ployment opportunities by providing private subsidies that lure out-of-
state businesses to relocate.82 Unlike the present system, where a sig-
nificant portion of the competition for businesses involves indirect
subsidies made through tax credits and tax holidays, the direct subsi-
dies used in expenditure-based competition should be more transpar-
ent to taxpayers who can then assess whether their elected officials
are using their funds wisely.83
Taxpayers would have several methods of curtailing overspending
by state officials. As an outer bound on spending, voters can demand
fiscal discipline by insisting that states operate under balanced-
budget restrictions. Indeed, many states already have such restric-
tions in place to discourage the purchase of governmental benefits
that exceed what taxpayers are willing to pay for them.84 Voters may
also conclude that their state government wastes too much of the in-
tergovernmental transfer it receives or that it should not spend the
entire intergovernmental transfer because it cannot find enough
worthwhile governmental benefits to purchase on the voters’ behalf.
80. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1121–22.
81. Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition or Harmonization? Some Reflections, 54
NAT’L TAX J. 507, 508 (2001).
82. Id.
83. Louise Story, The Empty Promise of Tax Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, at
A1 (identifying more than $80 billion of local tax incentives used each year to
attract companies and observing that “[a] full accounting . . . is not possible be-
cause the incentives are granted by thousands of government agencies and offi-
cials, and many do not know the value of all their awards”).
84. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BAL-
ANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 3 tbl.1 (2010) (listing the forty-nine states—all but
Vermont—with constitutional or statutory provisions, or both, designed to curtail
unbalanced budgets). The report notes that only twenty-two states claim that a
legal enforcement mechanism accompanies that balanced-budget requirement.
Id. at 8–9.
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In those situations, voters can try to reduce the amount of federal
taxes imposed on them, leave for another state that offers a superior
set of benefits justifying their tax payments, or demand that the state
distribute a portion of the funds it receives from the federal govern-
ment directly to them (i.e., the equivalent of a federal tax refund). If
the state is responsive to that distribution demand, then logically the
resulting mix of governmental benefits and tax refunds should ap-
proximate the mix resulting from the current system where the state
justifies the taxes it levies by providing governmental benefits to its
taxpayers.85 Under those circumstances, there should be no difference
between a voter demand for a federal tax refund and a refusal to pay
additional state taxes.86 While instances of governments returning
funds to taxpayers do exist,87 numerous empirical studies have shown
that intergovernmental transfers increase a community’s governmen-
tal expenditures more than an equivalent increase in the community
members’ private income. This “flypaper effect”—so named because,
like a fly on flypaper, money tends to stick where it hits—suggests
that depending on tax refunds to properly calibrate governmental ben-
efit expenditures when the federal government’s transfer to a state is
too large may not always work.88 Nevertheless, voters should have
sufficient tools to influence the states’ governmental benefit expendi-
85. The logic underlying this conclusion is straightforward. Assuming that a state’s
voters’ appetite for governmental benefits is constant regardless of whether the
current system or the proposed system is in place, those voters will object if the
state keeps more tax revenue than is needed to obtain those benefits. Under the
current system, voters will object to tax levies that exceed the revenue amount
needed to obtain those governmental benefits. Under the proposed system, voters
will object to the state retaining intergovernmental transfers in excess of what is
needed to obtain those governmental benefits and will demand a distribution of
the excess. Either way, a responsive state government should end up with the
same amount of tax revenue to spend on the same governmental benefits.
86. This conclusion follows from the “veil hypothesis” found in fiscal federalism liter-
ature. According to that hypothesis, “a grant to a community is fully equivalent to
a central tax rebate to the individuals in the community.” Oates, Essay, supra
note 5, at 1129. In other words, an unconditional intergovernmental transfer
from the federal government to a state government (i.e., to the state community)
is equivalent to a federal tax rebate directly to the state’s residents. This Article’s
proposal converts state-level taxes into federal-level taxes, so a federal tax rebate
under the proposal is roughly equivalent to reduced state taxes in the current
system.
87. See supra note 71 (discussing the Alaska Permanent Fund and its annual divi-
dend to Alaskans).
88. James R. Hines & Richard H. Thaler, The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 217,
218 (1995) (“For unrestricted block grants, the estimated effects [on local spend-
ing] are often closer to 100 percent than to [the] 5 or 10 percent [predicted by
theory].”).
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ture decisions so that they are largely consistent with the voters’ col-
lective preferences, just as they do in the current system.89
C. Constitutional Viability
To carry out this proposal, Congress would need to do three things:
(1) preempt the states’ ability to impose taxes, other than real prop-
erty taxes and license taxes; (2) revise the federal tax system to raise
the additional tax revenue needed to replace the preempted state
taxes; and (3) create the unconditional intergovernmental transfer
system needed to fund the states’ governmental benefit expenditures.
The latter two are clearly within Congress’s enumerated constitu-
tional powers.90 Similarly, there is no real debate whether the Com-
merce Clause gives Congress the ability to restrict certain types of
taxing behavior by the states (e.g., discriminatory state taxation).91
The only open issue is whether the Commerce Clause power permits
Congress to limit the states’ taxing power to the extent proposed here.
While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed that issue, and
there are legitimate arguments supporting either conclusion, the
likely answer is yes.92
89. For example, voters might adapt the state tax-limitation triggers used in states
like Oregon and Colorado to fit this purpose. In Oregon, if total tax receipts ex-
ceed estimated receipts by more than two percent, the entire excess is automati-
cally returned to taxpayers. Martin A. Sullivan, Magic Money to Pay for Future
Tax Cuts, 145 TAX NOTES 1079, 1080 (2014). A state wishing to diminish the fly-
paper effect could put in place, in advance, triggers tied to the size of the uncondi-
tional intergovernmental transfer received that would limit its effective size by
requiring an automatic distribution to the state’s residents. See id. at 1079–80
(describing how some states have proactively used tax triggers to effectively cap
the amount of tax revenue they receive each year).
90. The U.S. Constitution endows the federal government with broad taxing and
spending powers. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; id. amend. XVI.
91. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015)
(“Although the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, ‘we
have consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command,
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even
when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.’ ”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995); Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense:
Implicit Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Preemption of State Tax,
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 41, 45 (concluding that the federal government has little
ability to preempt a state tax, but acknowledging that “the Commerce Clause
confers upon Congress . . . the power to prevent states from engaging in discrimi-
nation that would inure to the benefit of local commercial interests and other
forms of state-based economic protectionism”).
92. One enterprising law student commentator has even argued that the Commerce
Clause gives the Supreme Court the power fill the legislative void left by Con-
gress by expanding its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to force uniform
taxation at the state level. Brian L. Hazen, Comment, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court as Catalyst for Spurring Legislative
Gridlock in State Income Tax Reform, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1021, 1024. But see
Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State
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The main argument in favor of Congress’s power to preempt the
states’ taxing power is that the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
combine to give Congress a near-absolute regulatory power over eco-
nomic activity within the United States that trumps the states’ at-
tempts to tax that activity. According to recent Supreme Court case
law:
“The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regu-
lation of commerce among the states,” but extends to activities that “have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Congress’s power, moreover, is not
limited to regulation of an activity that by itself substantially affects inter-
state commerce, but also extends to activities that do so only when aggregated
with similar activities of others.93
Therefore, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate
a set of solely intrastate activities that, in the aggregate, substantially
affect interstate commerce.94 Only non-economic activity,95 economic
inactivity,96 and, presumably, non-economic inactivity fall outside the
Commerce Clause’s scope. Congress’s regulatory power extends to eco-
nomic activity even when the regulated activity is one that tradition-
ally falls within the states’ purview.97 Because the state taxes that
Congress would need to prohibit apply to economic activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce, the states’ ability to impose
those taxes is a form of economic regulation that falls within the scope
of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.98
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 ST. TAX NOTES 721, 724
(2004) (arguing that the courts should leave this problem to Congress because
“[l]egislative remedies can be more nuanced than judicial remedies”).
93. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (first quoting
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941); and then citing Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).
94. Id.
95. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (rejecting Congress’s use of
the Commerce Clause to address gender-motivated crimes of violence because
they “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”); id. (“[T]hus far in
our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intra-
state activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (rejecting Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause
to prohibit carrying a firearm near a school because that prohibition “has nothing
to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise” and “is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity”).
96. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 557.
97. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25, 41 (2005) (holding that the Commerce
Clause permits Congress to regulate the personal medicinal use of marijuana
while under the care of a physician despite the fact that medical care provided by
a physician is traditionally regulated by the states).
98. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 549–50. This result is also consistent with
the Supreme Court’s recent dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Comp-
troller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015) (using the
dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate Maryland’s tax scheme by focusing on
the relative effect it had on intrastate and interstate economic activity).
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If Congress exercises that Commerce Clause power to directly in-
validate state tax laws that fall within that Clause’s scope, the consti-
tutional issue becomes whether the federal or state law reigns
supreme. As the Supreme Court noted in Gonzales v. Raich, a case
dealing with California’s attempt to legalize medical marijuana in the
face of a federal law criminalizing all marijuana use:
The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict
between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond perad-
venture that federal power over commerce is “superior to that of the States to
provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,” however legitimate
or dire those necessities may be.99
The Court went on to observe that “state action cannot circumscribe
Congress’ plenary commerce power.”100 Thus, the Supreme Court’s
cases dealing with Congress’s affirmative use of its Commerce Clause
power indicate that Congress can regulate the states’ ability to tax
and that Congress’s power to do so is absolute.
That view is championed by one of the foremost academic experts
on state and local taxation,101 but it is not universally held. Propo-
nents of a more limited Congressional reach in this area question
whether the Commerce Clause reaches nondiscriminatory state
taxes102 and whether the federalism structure that the Founders built
into the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause authorizes Congress to com-
pletely preempt state taxation using its Commerce Clause power.103
The former concern boils down to the assertion that “the preemption of
a [nondiscriminatory] state tax constitutes the regulation of the
‘states as states’” instead of as economic actors.104 That position is
difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Califor-
nia’s medical marijuana law in Raich because the California law was
nondiscriminatory, and by regulating medicine California was, with-
99. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
100. Id.
101. See Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power, and Policy, 55
ST. TAX NOTES 555, 558 (2010) (testifying before Congress that the Commerce
Clause power to set state tax nexus rules allows Congress to do “just about any-
thing” and that “it may preempt state legislation that would be constitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause”); Walter Hellerstein, Federal Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congressional Power to Legislate Regarding State Taxation
of Electronic Commerce, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1307, 1309 (2000) (“[T]he [Supreme]
Court has explicitly indicated that Congress possesses power to legislate uniform
state tax rules among the states . . . .”); see also Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, 23 ST. TAX NOTES 775, 783
(2002) (“Congress plainly has the authority under the Commerce Clause to pre-
empt state or local taxation of multistate or multinational corporations.”).
102. Fatale, supra note 91, at 69–77.
103. Michael J. McIntyre, Thoughts on the Future of the State Corporate Income Tax,
25 ST. TAX NOTES 931, 941–44 (2002).
104. Fatale, supra note 91, at 73.
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out question, acting as a state, not an economic, actor.105 This argu-
ment also contradicts the Supreme Court’s long-standing, four-
pronged Complete Auto test for evaluating whether the dormant Com-
merce Clause invalidates a state tax because that test permits invali-
dation of a nondiscriminatory tax if the tax fails one of the other
prongs (e.g., it is not fairly apportioned).106 In short, though it does
not happen often, Congress’s Commerce Clause power can invalidate
nondiscriminatory state taxes.
Whether that power permits complete preemption of a state’s
power to impose a specific tax, or set of taxes, is another matter. The
legal argument against a broad preemption power is grounded in the
Constitution’s federalism principles.107 Those principles led the Foun-
ders to disperse governmental power among the federal and state sov-
ereigns with the newly created federal government dominant within
its limited sphere of enumerated powers and the states dominant eve-
rywhere else.108 For that balance-of-power arrangement to work, pre-
sumably neither the federal government nor the states should have
the power to destroy the other’s sovereignty.109 That constraint would
limit the federal government’s ability to prevent state taxation if doing
so would be equivalent to destroying the states’ sovereignty by deny-
ing the states any means of independently raising revenue to fund
their governmental activities.110 If this logic is correct, Congress’s
105. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–6.
106. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (“[N]o claim is
made that the activity is not sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or
that the tax is not fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly appor-
tioned.”); accord Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183–84
(1995).
107. McIntyre, supra note 103, at 938 (concluding that traditional federalism concepts
prevent Congress from using “its enumerated powers to abolish a major state
revenue source in the guise of regulating interstate commerce”).
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers afforded to Congress); id. art.
VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”); id.
amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
109. For that reason, an early Supreme Court holding denied the states the power to
tax the federal government or its instrumentalities because “the power to tax
involves the power to destroy.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
Interestingly, the opinion went on to note that:
the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the [Federal] Government. This is, we think, the unavoidable conse-
quence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared.
Id. at 436.
110. McIntyre, supra note 103, at 942.
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Commerce Clause power would not actually be plenary as the states’
conflicting fundamental right to tax would overcome it. The Supreme
Court’s language in Raich and other nontax Commerce Clause cases
would still be valid because those cases dealt with lesser state powers
that are not fundamental to the states’ existence as a sovereign.111
While that reasoning has some merit, and may even be what the
Founders originally envisioned when they thought about their pre-
dominately local, agrarian economy while drafting the Constitu-
tion,112 the United States’ subsequent progression to a national,
industrial economy and then to a global, information economy has un-
dermined its force.113 Throughout that evolution, the Supreme Court
has steadily asserted that “the taxing power of a State is one of its
attributes of sovereignty” and that that power “may be exercised to an
unlimited extent upon all property, trades, business, and avoca-
tions . . . except so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal gov-
ernment, either expressly or by necessary implication.”114 As
Congress’s Commerce Clause power expanded in response to the econ-
omy’s transformation into something that no single state could effec-
tively regulate,115 the states’ sovereign taxing power shrank
accordingly. Given the Commerce Clause power’s current breadth, it
seems likely Congress’s responsibility for regulating the national
economy trumps the states’ ability to raise revenue using one or more
specific taxes. Furthermore, loss of recourse to one or more taxes is not
111. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (finding California’s attempt to
regulate the medical marijuana market unconstitutional).
112. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (expressing no apparent concern
that the federal government’s new power to regulate commerce would endanger
the power of the state governments).
113. William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A Norma-
tive Approach, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 611, 611–12, 612 n.2 (2007) (recognizing that “per-
verse economic effects, such as might occur with tax havens and some other forms
of tax competition” have “become increasingly problematic with economic global-
ization”). The United States’ transition to an information-based economy has fur-
ther complicated these interstate tax issues. See, e.g., Kendall L. Houghton &
Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Perspectives on Pro-
posals for Change and Their Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9, 56–75 (dis-
cussing some of the state tax problems caused by electronic commerce and the
constitutional limits on Congress’s power to solve them).
114. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 29 (1873).
115. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (extending the Commerce
Clause so that “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,” which in the in-
stant case was represented by the national market for wheat); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (“When industries organize them-
selves on a national scale, . . . how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it
is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of
industrial war?”).
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the same as an outright ban on all taxation. Because the tax-assign-
ment solution proposed here would not completely prevent the states
from raising revenue through taxation, prohibiting them from using
certain specific taxes (e.g., income taxes and sales taxes) should be
permissible.116 After all, the states still retain their sovereign power
to tax so long as the tax in question is not tied to economic activity
(e.g., a head tax).
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ONE TAX SYSTEM PROPOSAL
The proposal’s main objective is to capture the numerous benefits
that come from a centralized tax system providing greater uniformity
to taxpayers. Unfortunately, those uniformity benefits are not cost-
free because centralization necessarily reduces any benefits derived
from the intergovernmental tax competition currently present in the
United States’ decentralized tax system. This Part draws on two dif-
ferent, but related, analytical frameworks to analyze and compare the
proposed solution to the current system. First, traditional tax policy
considerations are employed. Then, the alternatives are evaluated us-
ing fiscal federalism principles that take into account both taxation
and governmental expenditures. While tax policy considerations tilt in
favor of the proposed solution’s greater uniformity, the fiscal federal-
ism analysis identifies several potential objections to the proposal’s
combination of centralized taxation and decentralized governmental
spending. However, because recent advances in the field of behavioral
economics suggest that those theoretical objections are not likely to be
significant in practice, this Part concludes with the determination
that the proposed solution is an improvement over the current system.
A. Tax Policy Considerations
Traditionally, legal scholars evaluate the relative merits of compet-
ing tax policies or systems using the broad principles of economic effi-
ciency, complexity or ease of administration, and equity.117 For that
reason, those three considerations are important tools for determining
whether the proposed tax-assignment solution is superior to the cur-
rent system. Each one is employed here.
116. On occasion, Congress has preempted state taxation. A notable recent example is
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012), which prevented states
from taxing Internet access and from imposing “multiple or discriminatory taxes
on electronic commerce.” Id.
117. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 28 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009); see also Peter A.
Prescott, Taxing Luck, 83 MISS. L.J. 117, 156–75 (2014) [hereinafter Prescott,
Taxing Luck] (using the three tax-policy considerations to evaluate the taxation
of income received due to luck rather than labor or capital).
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1. Economic Efficiency
All else being equal, a tax system that distorts taxpayer decision-
making is inferior to one that does not because that distortion causes
economically inefficient behavior. In the absence of taxes, taxpayers
should make decisions that maximize their personal welfare.118 To the
extent that tax consequences change those decisions, a taxpayer’s per-
sonal welfare is reduced not only by the tax revenue paid to the gov-
ernment (which should benefit society as a whole), but also by the
additional deadweight loss resulting from that change (which is sim-
ply foregone personal welfare).119 An economically efficient tax sys-
tem minimizes that deadweight loss by avoiding situations where tax-
induced behavioral distortions drive decision-making.
The current tax system’s lack of uniformity among the states dis-
torts taxpayer decision-making by creating the functional equivalent
of tariffs on economic activity crossing state lines.120 The tariff-like
effect occurs because the taxpayer’s location, or the activity’s location,
affects which state or states tax the economic activity.121 Thus, a mul-
tistate business deciding whether to enter another state (or transact
with its residents) must factor that state’s taxes into its business deci-
sion. High taxes create a tariff-like barrier to entry that the taxpayer
must internalize through reduced profits, shift to its customers
through higher prices (if the market permits), or plan around. Regard-
less of the coping mechanism, the costs connected with the high taxes
will discourage some taxpayers from undertaking what would other-
wise be a private-welfare-maximizing step. Of course, lower state
taxes may have the opposite distorting effect by encouraging out-of-
state taxpayers to enter a state when they might not otherwise do so.
That fact inevitably causes states to compete for economic develop-
ment, and the accompanying jobs, by using tax incentives that inten-
tionally distort taxpayer decisions in the state’s favor.122 Although
each enticed business may be better off after capturing the promised
tax incentives, overall those incentives are not economically efficient
because the business and the impacted states collectively suffer a
deadweight loss when the business’s allocation of its resources and ac-
tivities among the states is suboptimal.123 Assuming that the busi-
118. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 117, at 28.
119. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 335–39 (7th ed.
2009).
120. Shaviro, supra note 50, at 898–99.
121. Id. at 900–01.
122. Story, supra note 83 (discussing how business’ demands for tax incentives
“creat[ed] a high-stakes bazaar where they pit local officials against one another
to get the most lucrative packages”).
123. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Con-
straints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 398–99
(1996) (“Even a tax break that succeeds in attracting a business investment to a
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ness would only distort its behavior if the tax incentive offered
exceeded the portion of the deadweight loss born by that business, the
tax incentive’s net negative consequences are born entirely by the
states through misallocated private economic development and fore-
gone taxes.124 Ironically, that means the states, viewed as a group,
use tax incentives to buy a net reduction in private economic
development.125
Even in the absence of direct state tax competition, tax differences
among states can unintentionally—at least from the perspective of
state taxing authorities—distort taxpayer decisions. Misalignment of
state tax laws can result in situations where certain income or sales
are taxed by several states or not taxed by any state.126 Predictably,
taxpayers try to avoid the former while pursuing the latter. The re-
sulting multistate tax planning distorts the taxpayer’s resource-allo-
cation decisions in ways that reduce the taxpayer’s pre-tax welfare to
gain a larger, offsetting tax benefit. As with intentional distortions,
the overall effect is suboptimal resource allocations and reduced tax
revenue. Unfortunately, the impact of these distortions has increased
as the United States has moved to an information economy where in-
tangible, intellectual property; cheap, instantaneous long-distance
communications; and relatively low transportation costs make it eas-
ier for taxpayers to rearrange their affairs to exploit unintentional
state tax system differences.127
state will represent a net loss for the states collectively, as long as that invest-
ment (together with all its derivative benefits for the winning state) would have
occurred in some state in the absence of the incentive.”).
124. The state that loses the tax competition suffers the most because it misses out on
the business’s optimal amount of economic development and on the resulting
state taxes. Although the winning state captures a lesser amount of economic
development and foregoes some tax revenue, the losses may be offset by the gains
from state taxes connected with that economic development. Thus, the winning
state still benefits through the business’s suboptimal economic development in
the state and, possibly, some increased tax revenue.
125. Taken to an extreme, such intentional tax competition creates a “race to the bot-
tom” scenario where competition drives the states to set their effective tax rates
at, or near to, zero to attract and retain businesses. In this circumstance, of
course, business will revert back to economically efficient resource allocation and
opt not to pay any taxes.
126. The latter is euphemistically called “nowhere” or stateless income. William F.
Fox, Matthew N. Murray & LeAnn Luna, How Should a Subnational Corporate
Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured?, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 157
tbl.1 (2005). The “stateless income” phenomenon also occurs in the international
tax context and has received significant attention in recent years. See, e.g., Ed-
ward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011).
127. Dan Bucks, A Key to Full and Fair Apportionment, 70 ST. TAX NOTES 29, 30
(2013) (acknowledging that comprehensive data is not available which demon-
strates the magnitude of the increase in “domestic income shifting aimed at erod-
ing state corporate tax bases,” but observing that “the opportunities for avoiding
state corporate taxes have increased as business operations change in response to
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The proposed centralized tax system eliminates unintentional
state tax distortions and greatly restricts the states’ ability to inten-
tionally distort taxpayer decision-making. Replacing all current state
taxes (except real property taxes and license taxes) with one uniform
set of federal taxes closes the existing gaps between state tax systems
that give rise to the unintentional distortions outlined above. Taxpay-
ers could no longer systematically rearrange their affairs in pursuit of
unintended state tax reductions that rely on suboptimal resource allo-
cations because the only remaining differences are tied to tax bases—
real property and state-issued licenses—that cannot be transferred
between states.128 Furthermore, the states’ loss of control over most
taxes would also limit their ability to intentionally lure taxpayers into
making decisions that, while good for the taxpayer and the winning
state, create a net loss overall when the misallocated private economic
development and foregone taxes are fully taken into account.129
Under the proposed system, tax competition among the states would
be limited to real property taxes and license taxes. Because the latter
is one of the lower-revenue state taxes, the amount of leverage it could
provide is limited.130 Although intentional property tax competition
among the states would persist, on the whole the proposed switch to a
centralized, uniform tax system should significantly improve economic
efficiency by reducing state tax-related distortions of taxpayer
decisions.
2. Tax Administrative Complexity
No one likes complexity when it comes to taxes.131 Ideally, our tax
system should be so straightforward that taxpayers and taxing au-
electronic and communications technologies, deregulation, globalization, and a
shift of corporate assets to intangibles”).
128. The states’ control over property taxes and license taxes is not likely to create
unintentional distortions because there is no potential overlap among the states
for these taxes. Only one state has the power to tax a given piece of real property
because that property is only located in one state. The same is true for license
taxes and other benefit taxes. While a state legislature may decide to set those
taxes lower than similar taxes in surrounding states to attract taxpayers, that
decision is an intentional attempt to distort taxpayer decision-making.
129. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text (explaining how this overall net
loss comes about).
130. See supra Table 1 (reporting aggregate state license taxes of $52.2 billion, which
was approximately 3.7% of total state tax revenue in fiscal year 2015).
131. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2012)
(“The most serious problem facing taxpayers—and the IRS—is complexity of the
Internal Revenue Code . . . .”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS iii–iv (2014) (grouping six of the twenty-three “most serious
problems encountered by taxpayers” under the heading “The Right to a Fair and
Just Tax System: Complexity”). Tax professionals and law professors may be ex-
ceptions to this statement because complex laws provide a steady stream of busi-
ness for the former and publication fodder for latter.
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thorities would incur minimal costs in connection with its administra-
tion. In reality, both sides spend considerable amounts of time and
money navigating through the tax system.132 For that reason, tax
scholars and policymakers regularly look for ways to reduce those ad-
ministrative costs by reducing the tax system’s complexity. Their ef-
forts typically target three distinct types of complexity—compliance
complexity, transactional complexity, and rules complexity—because
each type increases administrative costs, usually for taxpayers and
taxing authorities.133 While there is no magic formula for combatting
tax system complexity, decreasing the number of tax rules that apply
to each taxpayer and promoting the consistent and uniform applica-
tion of those rules to taxpayers should improve the tax system by re-
ducing these three sources of unwanted administrative costs for both
sides.
Compliance complexity is the complexity that taxpayers confront
while complying with their tax-reporting obligations, including the
preparation and filing of the tax returns and the maintenance of suffi-
cient records to support the amounts shown on those returns.134 For
taxing authorities, this type of complexity is the procedural complex-
ity faced when attempting to effectively and efficiently administer the
tax laws.135 Not surprisingly, the current tax system’s decentralized
approach of overlapping taxes administered by the federal govern-
ment and fifty states creates significant compliance complexity.136 For
example, a taxpayer doing business in multiple states must file a sep-
arate income tax return for each state and a federal income tax re-
turn.137 Because each government’s laws are slightly different, each
tax return requires some customization and, most likely, a distinct set
132. In 2012, the National Taxpayer Advocate estimated that “individuals and busi-
nesses spend about 6.1 billion hours a year complying with the filing require-
ments of the Internal Revenue Code” and that annual compliance costs exceed
$150 million. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5–6
(2012).
133. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266–67 (Harv. Univ.
Press 1986) (distinguishing three types of complexity—compliance, transactional,
and rule); Steve R. Johnson, The E.L. Wiegand Lecture: Administrability-Based
Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 581–82 (2004) (considering the same con-
cepts, but breaking complexity into detail complexity, outcome complexity, and
forms complexity).
134. Prescott, Taxing Luck, supra note 117, at 170.
135. Peter A. Prescott, Jumping the Shark: The Case for Repealing the TEFRA Part-
nership Audit Rules, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 503, 520 (2011) [hereinafter Prescott,
Jumping the Shark] (evaluating compliance complexity in the context of the IRS’s
partnership audit procedures).
136. Janet G. Stotsky & Emil M. Sunley, United States, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 359, 361–62.
137. For a corporation doing business in all fifty states, that could mean forty-six in-
come tax returns. See LEE ET AL., supra note 24 (reporting that forty-five states
impose a net income tax on corporations).
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of supporting tax records that reflects those differences.138 Thus, the
current tax system imposes substantial compliance costs on
taxpayers.
The compliance-complexity picture for taxing authorities under the
current tax system is slightly different, but the overall result of unnec-
essarily high compliance costs is the same. Even if each taxing author-
ity is quite efficient at administering its own tax laws and minimizes
its compliance costs, the fact that each state’s tax administration oper-
ates in parallel with those in the other states injects unnecessary com-
pliance costs into the overall tax system because each state tax agency
will need to separately scrutinize the taxpayer’s tax return and may
have to dispute the same tax issues with the same taxpayer instead of
dealing with them all at once. To prevent multistate taxpayers from
taking inconsistent factual and legal positions in different states, the
state tax administrators engage in information exchange arrange-
ments with their counterparts in the federal government and other
states.139 Of course, the personnel redundancies (e.g., fifty-one tax
commissioners) needed to support those parallel tax administrations
are incrementally costly, too.140
Consolidating most tax administration at the federal level should
significantly reduce the costs associated with compliance complexity.
For taxpayers, the compliance burden will greatly diminish because
they will only have to deal with one set of tax rules requiring one set of
tax records and one set of tax returns. On the tax authority side, the
parallel state tax administrations with their redundant personnel and
duplicative tax return review and dispute processes would largely fold
into the existing federal tax administration. Accordingly, from the
compliance-complexity perspective the proposed tax system is clearly
superior to the one currently in place.
Moving to the proposed tax system would also reduce transac-
tional-complexity costs. Transactional complexity decreases when tax-
system changes make it easier for taxpayers to legally minimize their
taxes by arranging their affairs in a straightforward manner.141 Es-
138. For example, basis rules require completely different asset accounts. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE § 6–3–1–3.5(b)(5) (2017) (defining “taxable income” for corporations to
include an adjustment that removes the effects of any bonus depreciation deduc-
tion allowed under I.R.C. § 168(k) in the taxable year that the property was
placed in service).
139. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (2017) (requiring the IRS to make the federal tax
returns and associated information that it receives “open to inspection by . . . any
State agency, body, or commission . . . which is charged under the laws of such
State with responsibility for the administration of State tax laws for the purpose
of . . . the administration of such laws”).
140. Those incremental costs may not always be viewed negatively. See Stotsky &
Sunley, supra note 136, at 362 (noting that “the loss of state jobs” was one reason
state governments have resisted centralizing tax administration in the past).
141. BRADFORD, supra note 133, at 267.
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sentially, managing transactional complexity means acknowledging
that tax systems are never perfectly economically efficient and then
seeking to minimize the transactional cost of any ensuing behavioral
distortions. As discussed above, the current tax system facilitates dis-
tortion of taxpayer decisions through intentional tax competition
among the states to attract taxpayers and through unintentional mis-
matches between state tax systems.142 The intentional distortions
from state tax competition cause taxpayers to spend time and money
lobbying and negotiating with state legislators and tax officials to cap-
ture tax incentives from the state.143 The states also incur costs com-
peting with other states to lure taxpayers using tax incentives.144
Similarly, the unintentional distortions increase transactional-com-
plexity costs because taxpayers spend time and money working with
tax professionals to identify and exploit the misalignments between
state tax laws (i.e., loopholes) that lead to unintended tax savings and
because taxing authorities must dedicate considerable resources to
identifying and closing those loopholes.145 Because moving to the pro-
posed tax system would eliminate unintentional state tax distortions
and greatly restrict the states’ ability to intentionally distort taxpayer
decision making, taxpayers and taxing authorities would no longer
need to engage in the tax planning and lobbying activities that give
rise to the current tax system’s economically unproductive transac-
tional-complexity costs.
Installing a single, uniform tax system for most state taxes should
diminish the negative effects of rules complexity, too. The new system
would make it easier for taxpayers and the taxing authorities to un-
derstand how the tax system’s rules apply to interstate commerce.146
At present, both sides must interpret and apply the complex set of
rules that govern the taxation of businesses and transactions that
span more than one state. Those rules address fundamental tax issues
such as: (1) whether a business has sufficient contacts with a state to
create nexus that subjects it to taxation by that state,147 (2) how to
142. See supra notes 120–27 and accompanying text.
143. Story, supra note 83 (“[The companies] dictate their terms, and we’re not really in
a position to question their deal terms [because] [w]e don’t have the sophistica-
tion or the resources to negotiate with a company that has the wherewithal the
size of a country.” (quoting a county official in Texas)).
144. Id.
145. INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, “NOWHERE INCOME” AND THE THROWBACK
RULE 1 (2011), http://www.itep.org/pdf/pb39throw.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
N8Y7-DAPR] (“[M]any large businesses are aware that they can set up their op-
erations to maximize nowhere income and minimize the taxes they owe.”).
146. See Prescott, Jumping the Shark, supra note 135, at 520 (explaining that rules
complexity arises when the written and unwritten rules are difficult to interpret
and apply).
147. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (deciding whether
North Dakota could require a mail-order retailer to collect and remit use tax on
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identify the share of a business taxpayer’s income that the state can
tax because the activities generating that income are part of the tax-
payer’s unitary business operating in that state,148 and (3) how to
source and apportion the business taxpayer’s income from its unitary
business among the states that have the ability to tax it.149 The rules
complexity resulting from these three issues is compounded by the
fact that each state has its own set of rules to answer them and that
none of them has a single, obviously correct answer. Not surprisingly,
the resulting web of overlapping rules leads to many tax disputes.
Even if these cross-border issues are resolved, disputes often still arise
over how to properly determine intercompany transfer prices when le-
gally separate entities in a consolidated business enterprise transact
with each other.150 In recent years, interstate transfer pricing
problems have become particularly common and difficult to resolve as
intangible intellectual property and services have become a more
prominent part of the U.S. economy because the greater mobility asso-
ciated with those types of income has made it easier for multi-state
businesses to engage in cross-border intercompany transactions that
attempt to shift income from high-tax states to low-tax states.151 All
four of these contentious, and tricky, tax issues would become moot if
the current set of state-specific tax rules is replaced by the centralized,
uniform tax system proposed here. Consequentially, that change
would simplify the tax rules for multi-state businesses and signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of wasteful tax litigation.
its sales into the state when that retailer merely solicited sales from outside the
state and shipped them into the state via the mail or common carriers).
148. See, e.g., Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 20 (Cal. 1947) (ruling
that despite the fact that business operations spanned multiple commonly owned
entities, “if the operations in California contributed to the net income derived
from the entire operations in the United States, then the entire business is so
clearly unitary as to require a fair system of apportionment by the formula
method in order to prevent either overtaxation or undertaxation”).
149. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942) (concluding that an
apportionment formula based on property, payroll, and sales is appropriate “to
allocate to California its just proportion of the profits earned by appellant from
this unitary business”).
150. Transfer pricing has become such an important, and thorny, issue that the Multi-
state Tax Commission created the Arm’s-Length Adjustment Service Committee
to “support states seeking to improve equitable business tax compliance in cir-
cumstances where taxpayers are found to use transactions among related parties
to undermine equity in taxation.” MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, DESIGN FOR AN MTC
ARM’S-LENGTH ADJUSTMENT SERVICE i, iii (2015), http://www.mtc.gov/getattach-
ment/The-Commission/Committees/ALAS/Draft-of-Final-Design-Design-for-
ALAS.pdf.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/ESG2-CK2A].
151. Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), is a
classic example of this sort of cross-border tax planning by Toys “R” Us, Inc. Of
course, in the end that planning did not work out well for the taxpayer. Id. at
18–19.
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In short, the proposed tax system’s cross-border uniformity would
reduce the costs resulting from compliance complexity, transactional
complexity, and rules complexity.152 Given that reality, one might
wonder why taxpayers and the states have not already standardized
the states’ tax systems to capture those simplification savings. In fact,
many states have taken steps to do just that—at least partially.153 On
the individual and corporate income tax fronts, most states have
passed laws tying their income tax bases to the “taxable income” in
the federal Internal Revenue Code.154 Furthermore, forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia are members of the Multistate Tax Com-
mission,155 which “is an intergovernmental state tax agency working
on behalf of states and taxpayers to administer, equitably and effi-
ciently, tax laws that apply to multistate and multinational enter-
152. Permitting real property taxes and license taxes to remain at the state level, and
non-uniform across the states, should not have much effect on the proposed tax
system’s complexity. As should be clear from the discussion above, the benefits of
greater uniformity are most significant when the tax base in question is mobile
and when legal issues, not factual issues, are involved because the former are
specific to a particular taxing jurisdiction and the latter are taxpayer specific.
The tax base for real property taxes is real property, which by its nature is lo-
cated in only one state and is immobile. Therefore, there is little compliance com-
plexity because the property owner must only report to the one state taxing
authority with the power to tax the property’s value. In addition, with the excep-
tion of lobbying the state for a real property tax reduction, real property taxes are
not vulnerable to the types of tax planning that lead to transactional complexity.
Finally, because the major issue for real property taxes is factual (i.e., the prop-
erty’s value), moving to a federal real property tax system is not likely to reduce
the number of tax disputes due to rules complexity.
153. It appears that partial standardization is about the best that can be hoped for
from the states. When Congress presented the states with an opportunity to pig-
gyback their income tax on the federal income tax, with tax administration to be
carried out by the IRS, no state elected to pursue that option. Stotsky & Sunley,
supra note 136, at 362.
154. On the individual income tax front: “Of the 41 states (plus the District of Colum-
bia) with broad-based personal income taxes, 40 states and the District connect in
some way to the federal system by incorporating a range of federal tax expendi-
tures—exclusions, deductions, and credits—into their state tax codes.” THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TAX CODE CONNECTIONS: HOW CHANGES TO FEDERAL POLICY
AFFECT STATE REVENUE 1 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2016/
02/FiscalFed_FederalTaxPolicyChangesReport_v6_WEB.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/ZF4D-PUYR]; see also Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, How Federal
Policymakers Account for the Concerns of State and Local Governments in the
Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 631, 640–43 (2007) (examin-
ing how state tax revenue was affected when the federal government changed
income tax definitions which the state had adopted); Ruth Mason, Delegating Up:
State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013) (outlining
the costs and benefits of the states’ decisions to piggyback on the federal tax
base).
155. Member States, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/
Member-States [https://perma.unl.edu/H52X-2AVG].
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prises.”156 One of the Commission’s main objectives is to “promot[e]
uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax systems”
by developing uniform model laws that the member states then adopt
as their own.157 Those model laws focus on sales taxes, use taxes, and
income taxes where cross-border tax issues are most prevalent.158 Un-
fortunately, the states’ current efforts fall short because not all states
participate in these two simplification approaches and because many
that do still make some state-specific changes to the Code or the model
statutes. Thus, the proposed tax system would still reduce complexity-
related administrative costs for taxpayers and taxing authorities.
3. Equity
Uniformity usually improves equity among taxpayers because the
rules in a uniform tax system apply equally to all. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the proposed tax system fairs well when equitable tax-
policy principles are considered. Tax equity focuses on whether the tax
burden needed to fund the required level of governmental benefits is
fairly distributed across the taxpayers contributing to those bene-
fits.159 One traditional measure of fairness—horizontal equity—is rel-
atively uncontroversial because it requires that similarly situated
taxpayers contribute the same amount of taxes to the common under-
taking.160 The other fairness measure—vertical equity—is satisfied
when the tax distribution fairly reflects an agreed-upon external mea-
sure, like the level of benefits received by the taxpayers under consid-
eration or the taxpayer’s ability to pay the taxes.161 Vertical equity
determinations are controversial because reasonable people disagree
about the external measure that should be used to assess vertical eq-
uity and about what constitutes a fair distribution under a given mea-
sure (e.g., whether a progressive, proportional, or regressive tax is fair
when using the ability-to-pay criterion to assess vertical equity). Be-
cause the proposal’s main purpose is to replace the existing patchwork
system of state-specific taxes with a nationwide system of uniform
taxes, this analysis focuses on whether that change improves or
reduces equity.162
156. The Commission, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission
[https://perma.unl.edu/AD8W-UJ8H].
157. Id.
158. Multistate Tax Compact, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Com-
mission/ Multistate-Tax-Compact [https://perma.unl.edu/2MS2-CGB4].
159. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 117, at 27.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Although it is true that the proposal’s shift from the varying mix of taxes and
rates imposed on taxpayers by their separate states to a uniform federal set of
taxes and rates will necessarily change the tax situation for individual taxpayers,
net taxes paid to government by those taxpayers do not need to change much, or
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Standardizing taxes across state borders should improve horizon-
tal equity by imposing the same set of rules on all taxpayers operating
within each state.163 Currently, a multistate business can use the tax-
planning opportunities described above to reduce the tax burden on its
operations within a given state.164 That multistate business may also
be able to lobby for special tax preferences from the state in exchange
for agreeing to enter the state in the first place.165 Together, these
reductions give the multistate business an advantage over local com-
petitors who only operate within that state. While it is arguably true
that the multistate and local businesses differ in geographic scope,
with respect to their operations within the state they are still simi-
larly situated taxpayers who should receive equal tax treatment by
that state. That conclusion is equally true in situations where the
state attempts to target out-of-state taxpayers for higher taxation.
Thus, the proposed tax system’s imposition of a single nationwide tax
system that eliminates cross-border tax effects should improve hori-
zontal equity.
From a vertical equity perspective, the current tax system raises
several tax-distribution concerns that would not arise under the pro-
posed system. For example, to the extent that a multistate business
successfully avoids a state’s taxation, that business claims some gov-
ernmental benefits from that state by virtue of its activities within
that state without paying for those benefits.166 As a result, state tax-
payers are unfairly left to overpay for those benefits.167 Furthermore,
because multistate businesses tend to be larger and have greater fi-
at all. For example, formerly low-tax states could decide to simply return some of
the unconditional grants that they receive from the federal government to their
taxpayers.
163. Cross-border tax differences can result in unfairness when the tax disparities
they created are not enough to distort taxpayers’ behavior (i.e., there is inelastic
demand for the behavior in question with respect to taxes) because they can
cause two otherwise identical taxpayers to pay differing amounts of tax purely
because of the state they chose to locate in. Shaviro, supra note 50, at 901.
164. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (recounting the costs that taxpayers
and taxing authorities incur because unintentional gaps and misalignments
exist).
165. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text (describing multistate business’s
efforts to exploit intentionally provided tax incentives).
166. A classic example of this result occurred in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 301–02 (1992), in which North Dakota was not allowed to collect use tax
from an out-of-state retailer on sales to customers within its borders even though
the retailer clearly benefited from the services provided by the state (e.g., the
roads used to deliver the retailers goods to its customer and, at a broader level,
the state’s economy).
167. Foisting disproportionately high state taxes on an out-of-state business would be
equally unfair because that out-of-state business ends up paying for governmen-
tal benefits enjoyed by local taxpayers. Of course, a tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce in this manner “is virtually per se invalid,” and “will
survive only if it ‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
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nancial resources than local businesses, a system that effectively
taxes such businesses at a lower rate than their local competitors is
regressive and would be deemed unfair by most.
One equitable argument in favor of the current tax system’s state-
specific taxes is that each state’s taxpayers are not similarly situated
with taxpayers in other states because they have different preferences
regarding governmental benefits that are reflected in the states’ dif-
fering tax levels (assuming no deficit spending).168 To the extent that
these higher or lower taxes actually map to more or less governmental
benefits (i.e., the federal government does not force cross-border subsi-
dization of benefits by redistributing funds from one state to another),
this argument in favor of the current system is valid. Of course, it
cannot extend to the funding of governmental benefits that all U.S.
residents are entitled to receive regardless of their state. In addition,
under the proposed tax system each state would retain the power to
match its level of governmental benefits to its residents’ preferences
by simply returning some of its unconditional grant to them instead of
spending it on additional benefits. For that reason, this argument in
favor of the current tax system fails to outweigh the horizontal- and
vertical-equity benefits of moving to a centralized, uniform tax
system.
In the end, it all comes down to uniformity. Under each of the three
tax policy considerations, the proposed tax system is superior to the
current tax system for taxpayers and taxing authorities because the
proposed system increases uniformity. Greater uniformity discourages
the wasteful behavioral distortions—whether intentional or uninten-
tional—that reduce economic efficiency. It also positively affects the
tax system’s complexity by eliminating the overlapping sets of tax
rules and taxing jurisdictions that currently plague taxpayers and
taxing authorities alike. Finally, greater uniformity improves horizon-
tal and vertical equity by ensuring that the same tax rules apply to
similarly situated taxpayers, regardless of geographic location within
the United States, and by preventing large multistate businesses from
using interstate tax-law mismatches to effectively create a regressive
tax system that allows them to avoid bearing their fair share of the
benefits provided by the states. For all these reasons, a traditional tax
policy analysis favors the proposed change over the status quo.
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’” Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citations omitted).
168. For example, the fact that Californians paid, on average, $5325 of state and local
taxes in 2013 might signal that they desire more services from their state and
local governments than do Texans, who only paid, on average, $3862 that year.
State and Local Tax Revenue, Per Capita, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Mar. 20, 2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-and-local-tax-revenue-capita
[https://perma.unl.edu/S3FD-CS9A].
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B. Fiscal Federalism Considerations
From a fiscal federalism perspective, the proposed tax-assignment
change is desirable if the resulting distribution of taxes among the
federal government and the states improves the government’s overall
performance, taking into account both levels.169 Evaluating the new
tax assignments requires considering the taxes themselves and the
pairing of those taxes with the governmental responsibilities that they
fund. Pairing matters to fiscal federalists because they generally be-
lieve that governmental benefits, and the accompanying taxes, should
be provided by the lowest level of government encompassing those
benefits and taxes.170 That fiscal-decentralization bias reflects the
view that lower levels of government should be more responsive to
their residents’ preferences for governmental benefits and taxes,171
and that competition between those lower-level governments should
limit exploitation by government officials—who may be more inter-
ested in personal gain than helping the people they represent—by
pushing all governing units to optimize the combination of taxes and
benefits they provide.172 Consistent with fiscal federalism’s joint con-
cern over taxes and governmental expenditures, the analysis here has
two distinct lines—tax-specific considerations and tax-coordination
considerations.
Like the tax-policy considerations, the tax-specific fiscal federalism
considerations strongly favor the proposed tax system’s consolidation
of most taxes at the federal level. However, the tax-coordination fiscal
federalism considerations are more mixed and raise the strongest, and
most common, objections to the proposal. Those objections concern the
proposal’s combination of centralized taxation and decentralized gov-
ernmental expenditures because separating responsibility for those
two functions may weaken intergovernmental competition’s ability to
optimize government behavior. In the end, while the fiscal federalism
analysis is not as one-sided as the tax policy analysis, it does support
the proposed change.
169. Musgrave, supra note 7, at 2.
170. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1125.
171. David E. Wildasin, Pre-Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxa-
tion, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 649, 653 (2007).
172. Paolo Liberati, “Which Tax” or “Which Tax for What?”: Tax Assignment in the
Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 39 PUB. FIN. REV. 365, 375 (2011). In short, Liberati
advocates for a public-choice-based theory of competitive federalism because
voter mobility constrains the nonbenevolent despots who we appoint as agents to
represent our interests. Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Normative Tax
Theory for a Federal Polity: Some Public Choice Preliminaries, in TAX ASSIGN-
MENT IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES, supra note 7, at 52, 59–63.
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1. Tax-Specific Considerations
Not surprisingly, many of the main tax-specific fiscal federalism
considerations overlap heavily with the tax-policy considerations dis-
cussed above. When evaluating a tax in isolation, fiscal federalists are
primarily concerned with whether the tax is imposed on an appropri-
ate set of taxpayers and whether it will produce a steady supply of tax
revenue to fund the desired level of governmental benefits.173 To that
end, they prefer tax systems that cannot be easily avoided, are im-
posed on the people who receive the corresponding governmental ben-
efits, and have relatively stable tax bases.174 Some fiscal federalists
also argue that a good tax system helps ensure an equal distribution
among residents of the community’s shared resources (e.g., natural re-
sources like oil and gas reserves).175
A tax is easily avoided when it has a mobile tax base that can be
readily moved from one taxing jurisdiction to another. Under those
circumstances, sophisticated taxpayers will exploit the tax-arbitrage
opportunities created when states use different tax bases or tax rates
by relocating themselves, or their economic activities, to states with
lower taxes. The resulting economic efficiency and administrative
complexity costs are discussed at length above.176 To curtail those
costs, fiscal federalists assert that the states should tax immobile tax
bases (e.g., real property, natural resources, and state-provided gov-
ernmental benefits) while leaving more mobile tax bases to the federal
government (e.g., business income taxes and sales taxes) because the
federal government’s jurisdictional reach is not as easily avoided.177
173. See, e.g., OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM supra note 74, at 121–25 (starting from the
states’ need to “divert needed resources into the public sector” through taxation
before noting that economists have “long stressed . . . the avoidance of excess bur-
den” and that the “tax system should have an equitable pattern of incidence”).
174. See, e.g., id. at 123–24 (explaining that efficiency considerations support tax sys-
tems where the taxing units are “unable to avoid the burden of the tax by altering
behavior” to move beyond the tax’s reach and that “it is generally desirable . . . to
have decentralized levels of government finance programs with their own reve-
nues”); see also Liberati, supra note 172, at 371 (“Local taxes should then be ap-
plied on an immobile basis.”).
175. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Assignment and Subnational Fiscal Auton-
omy, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 626, 628 (2000) [hereinafter
McLure, Tax Assignment] (discussing the economic efficiency and equity issues
created by the localized concentration of natural resources (e.g., oil) and why
those issues support taxing natural resources at the national level).
176. See supra subsections III.A.1–2.
177. McLure, Tax Assignment, supra note 175, at 628–30; see also Gurumurthi, supra
note 38, at 2302–07 (considering the proper assignment of most types of taxes
within a federal system). Of course, a taxpayer can still evade a federal tax by
moving itself or, in some cases, its economic activities outside the federal govern-
ment’s taxing jurisdiction. That international tax problem parallels the problem
discussed in this Article with one key exception—there is no analog to the federal
government sitting above the nations that can impose a common tax system over
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The current decentralized U.S. system does a poor job of avoiding
mobile tax bases at the state level. As noted in Table 1, two of the
states’ largest revenue sources in fiscal year 2015 were income taxes
and sales taxes, which are among the most mobile tax bases. The
states’ uneven taxation of business income and sale transactions is
particularly problematic because the resulting cross-border tax arbi-
trage opportunities distort the behavior of multistate taxpayers by en-
couraging them to allocate their resources in the pursuit of tax
savings instead of maximum economic productivity.
The proposal would substantially improve the U.S. tax system’s
performance by restricting the states’ taxing power to real property
taxes and license taxes. These two taxes have highly immobile tax ba-
ses because they are tied to the taxing state by virtue of physical loca-
tion or originating governmental authority. Neither of those attributes
can be easily severed from the state that taxes them. For that reason,
taxation at the state level is appropriate. The remaining taxes—in-
cluding the highly mobile income taxes and sales taxes—would shift
to the federal government and face a uniform tax system spanning the
entire United States. That change would eliminate the interstate tax-
arbitrage opportunities that currently make legal tax avoidance possi-
ble for many multistate taxpayers.
The opposite is also true. Just as a good tax system limits the abil-
ity of taxpayers to avoid their tax obligations, a good tax system limits
the government’s ability to tax outsiders who receive few, if any, of the
benefits provided by that government.178 That limitation is important
because, from a political perspective, taxes imposed on outsiders (i.e.,
nonresidents) to pay for benefits going to residents are often quite pop-
ular for obvious reasons.179 Under the current tax system, the Consti-
all of them. Nevertheless, the United States and some other developed countries
have struggled with the problem in recent years. See Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/
[https://perma.unl.edu/MM7G-2A2J] (“Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) re-
fers to tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to
artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations. Under the inclusive framework,
over 100 countries and jurisdictions are collaborating to implement the BEPS
measures and tackle BEPS.”).
178. Norregaard, supra note 6, at 54 (including “it should not be possible to ‘export’ the
tax to nonresidents” in his list of factors that should determine whether a partic-
ular tax should be assigned to the national level or the subcentral level).
179. Travel taxes (e.g., taxes on hotel occupancy and car rentals) are a familiar exam-
ple. In the words of Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, “Don’t tax you, don’t tax
me, tax that man behind the tree.” John H. Cushman, Jr., Russell B. Long, 84,
Senator Who Influenced Tax Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, http://www.ny-
times.com/2003/05/11/us/russell-b-long-84-senator-who-influenced-tax-laws.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/RQ22-SJ45].
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tution limits the states’ ability to tax nonresidents.180 Nevertheless,
the existence of fifty separate state taxing regimes increases the possi-
bility that states may successfully “export” some of their taxes to non-
residents with minimal contacts to the taxing state. By concentrating
taxing power at the federal level, the proposed tax system would effec-
tively eliminate that possibility by doing away with state-level distinc-
tions between residents and nonresidents, in relation to U.S.
residents. In addition, federal-level income and sales taxes are argua-
bly better aligned with governmental benefits in light of the federal
government’s increasing importance as regulator of the national econ-
omy and provider of governmental benefits to U.S. residents. For
those reasons, the proposed tax centralization should modestly im-
prove the U.S. tax system under this criterion.
A third important tax-specific consideration is the tax system’s al-
location of tax-revenue volatility among the federal government and
the states. A volatile tax-revenue stream creates problems by encour-
aging the government to expand governmental benefits during periods
of economic growth and increasing tax revenue, and by forcing the
later contraction of those same (now-expected) benefits when tax reve-
nue craters during a recession or depression.181 Such benefit swings
contribute to unrealistic taxpayer expectations during good times and
the potential for unmet demands for assistance during bad times.182
Thus, a good tax system minimizes the magnitude and impact of those
benefit swings by shifting tax-revenue volatility to the level of govern-
ment that is best able to cope with it.183
For a number of reasons, the federal government is better posi-
tioned to withstand tax-revenue volatility than the individual states.
Because the federal government’s taxing jurisdiction includes all of
the states, the federal tax base represents a diversified portfolio of the
states’ tax bases. That tax-base diversification should mitigate the im-
pact of state-specific economic fluctuations on the federal govern-
ment’s ability to provide stable governmental benefits, including the
intergovernmental transfers used by the states to pay for some of the
benefits that they provide to their residents, by allowing it to offset
180. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (exploring the limita-
tions imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses on the states’ power to
tax nonresidents).
181. Stark, supra note 9, at 416–17.
182. Id. at 416–17.
183. Id. at 436–42 (recommending that the federal government not encourage the
states to rely on more volatile taxes and suggesting ways that the federal govern-
ment could encourage the opposite behavior by the states); see also Darien Shan-
ske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and
Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413, 429 (2012) (“Because sub-national entities
are not going to be subject to the full consequences of poor financial decision-
making ex post, it is particularly important that the federal government nudge
these other entities to better policies ex ante.”).
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one state’s economic growth against another state’s recession. When
that diversification protection fails because too many states simulta-
neously undergo an economic downturn, the federal government is
better able to cover the resulting tax-revenue shortfall through bor-
rowing money at lower interest rates.184 Of course, in extreme cases
the federal government can always cover shortfalls by printing
money.185
The federal government’s relative strength in this area suggests
that it should take steps to internalize tax-revenue volatility while en-
suring that the states have a stable revenue source for funding their
provision of governmental benefits.186 The proposed tax system can
accomplish that goal by assigning taxing power to the federal govern-
ment and providing the states with unconditional intergovernmental
transfers that are relatively stable and fixed in amount.187 Of the two
allocation methods discussed in subsection II.B.2, the population-
based, per-capita allocation method should prove more stable than the
method allocating transfers based on each state’s relative contribution
to the federal government’s total tax revenue for the year. In fact, the
latter approach would actually undermine the federal government’s
stabilizing effect by shifting much of the tax-revenue volatility back to
the states. Thus, the proposed tax system’s ability to manage tax-reve-
nue volatility and its impact on the provision of governmental benefits
is an improvement on the tax-assignment strategy used currently.
Finally, as a matter of fundamental fairness, a good tax system
should help ensure that its residents share the benefits from commu-
184. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (comparing the borrowing power of the
federal government to that of the individual states). For some states (and their
major cities), the borrowing power discrepancy is extreme. See Monique Garcia,
Rauner, Madigan Blame Each Other for Illinois’ Credit Rating Downgrade, CHI.
TRIB., June 9, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-
credit-rating-downgrade-rauner-madigan-met-0610-20160609-story.html [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/H4TW-KGN2] (reporting Illinois’ downgrade to two notches
above junk bond status, which should result in significantly increased future bor-
rowing costs, and anticipating that the higher interest rates resulting from the
city of Chicago’s current junk status will cost “taxpayers tens of millions of extra
dollars”).
185. Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. 457 (1871) (holding that the U.S. Con-
stitution gives Congress the authority to approve the issuance of paper money).
The states are forbidden to print money. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“No State
shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; [or] make any Thing but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”).
186. Stark, supra note 9, at 437–38 (arguing that if the federal government has a com-
pelling interest in “minimizing the risk of state fiscal crises,” then it should take
action to discourage the states from adopting a mix of taxes that are highly
volatile).
187. It is worth noting that at least one of the two taxes remaining at the state level—
the real property tax—is currently one of the most stable sources of state reve-
nue. Id. at 422–23.
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nal resources equally (e.g., natural resources like oil and natural
gas).188 This last tax-specific consideration leads to different optimal
tax systems depending on whether the states are viewed as separate
communities or whether the United States is one community. Fiscal
federalists have long observed that only the highest level of govern-
ment in a multilevel system is capable of redistributing resources
among residents in the lower levels.189 Therefore, if the states are sep-
arate communities with separate sets of communal assets, then state
taxation of those assets is appropriate because there is no need to re-
distribute the benefits from assets that are unequally distributed
among the states. However, if the United States is one community
with one set of communal assets, then it is difficult to justify why some
states (e.g., Alaska and North Dakota) should disproportionately ben-
efit from communal assets simply because those assets (e.g., oil
reserves) happen to reside within their boundaries. In that case, a cen-
tralized tax system does a better job capturing the economic benefits
of communal assets and sharing them equally among the states.
To some extent, the federal components of the current tax system
equalize the benefits of communal assets like oil and gas reserves by
taxing the income from businesses that develop those assets and
spending the resulting revenue on government benefits that go to all
U.S. residents regardless of state residence. That said, a certain level
of resource inequality persists because the individual states contain-
ing those resources can use state taxes to claim a disproportionate
share of the resulting economic benefits. As a result, the residents of
those resource-rich states disproportionately benefit from the happen-
stance of their geographic proximity to those communal assets.190
Moving to the proposed centralized tax system should produce a more
equal distribution of these benefits among the states by pooling all tax
revenues (except real property taxes and license taxes191) at the fed-
188. See McLure, Tax Assignment, supra note 175, at 629 (“Questions of equity also
arise: why should those who live in resource-rich areas have access to public ser-
vices on more favourable terms than those in other areas?”).
189. See OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 74, at 6–8, 14 (explaining why a cen-
tral government is better suited to redistribute wealth among the member of a
federal system); Musgrave, supra note 7, at 11 (endorsing as a tax-assignment
rule the principle that “progressive taxation, designed to secure redistributional
objectives, should be primarily central”).
190. Of course, when energy prices fall, these oil-revenue dependent states suffer.
John W. Schoen, Painful Transition for Energy States as Oil Revenues Evaporate,
CNBC (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/18/painful-transition-for-en-
ergy-states-as-oil-revenues-evaporate.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7STP-NAHY]
(identifying the oil-revenue dependent states and reporting how they have been
hurt by falling oil revenue).
191. Arguably, leaving these two taxes at the state level is suboptimal under this cri-
terion because each tax can be used to over-tax the resources located within a
state. For example, the presence of oil underneath a plot of land increases its
property value, which increases the resulting real property taxes.
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eral level. If those federal funds are then distributed among the states
using a per-capita allocation method to determine the size of each
state’s unconditional intergovernmental transfer, the overall effect
would be to increase fairness by providing each U.S. resident with an
equal share the benefits from communal resources.
Focusing solely on tax-specific fiscal federalism considerations, the
proposed tax-assignment change is desirable because it would in-
crease tax fairness and economic efficiency while reducing the costs of
dealing with tax-revenue volatility. Taxpayers would have a more dif-
ficult time avoiding their tax responsibilities, and state governments
would lose much of their ability to “export” taxes by imposing them on
nonresidents. The federal government would assume the task of cop-
ing with tax-revenue volatility because its broad fiscal powers make it
uniquely qualified to effectively manage that volatility risk so that
governmental benefit levels are not unnecessarily compromised dur-
ing economic downturns. Given these conclusions, and the similar re-
sults from the tax policy analysis in section III.A, if there is any
justification for retaining the current system, it must come from tax-
coordination fiscal federalism considerations.
2. Tax-Coordination Considerations
Tax-coordination considerations expand the analysis of a federal
tax system to factor in the relationship between the assignment of tax-
ing authority to different levels of government and those governments’
responsibility for providing governmental benefits. Generally, the fis-
cal federalism literature supports the conclusion that taxing authority
should be aligned with expenditure authority so that governmental
benefits and the tax revenues that fund them are paired.192 That
broad principle leads to two related considerations. First, arguments
in favor of locating expenditure authority at a particular level of gov-
ernment may influence, and even dictate, the answer to fiscal federal-
ism’s tax-assignment problem. Second, any misalignment between tax
revenue and governmental expenditures should be carefully scruti-
nized to determine whether the resulting costs of that misalignment
are justified by an offsetting benefit. Because the proposal combines
centralized taxation and decentralized governmental expenditures,
these two new considerations highlight some concerns about the pro-
posal’s desirability. However, for the reasons outlined below, those
concerns are not enough to overcome the proposal’s benefits.
Because expenditure authority location may indirectly affect the
desirability of some tax-assignment solutions, arguments favoring ex-
penditure decentralization are important when evaluating this Arti-
cle’s proposed centralized-taxation approach. Traditionally, fiscal
192. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1121–22; Ter-Minassian, supra note 65, at 8–9.
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federalism scholars have taken the position that governmental bene-
fits should be provided by the lowest government level fully encom-
passing those benefits (and the attendant costs) because that
approach is expected to produce the best alignment between the re-
sidents’ appetite for governmental benefits and the benefits that they
actually receive.193 An assignment of expenditure authority to a more
centralized level of government that covers a larger number of re-
sidents runs the risk of unnecessarily washing out regional prefer-
ences regarding the appropriate level of governmental benefits that
would have increased overall welfare if they had been identified and
satisfied more locally.194 In short, more centralized governmental ben-
efit decision-making is likely to decrease the social welfare created by
those benefits—if they have localized effects—because the central gov-
ernment is more likely to overlook local preferences.
Even when a central government is aware of regional variations in
preferences, for political reasons that government is more likely to
provide uniform benefits that are not customized to reflect local pref-
erences.195 Unfortunately, that loss of specificity has the potential to
be quite costly from a welfare perspective when significant regional
variations in demand for governmental benefits are present and local-
ized demand for those benefits is inelastic.196 Because there is reason
to believe that that demand is relatively inelastic, welfare losses from
expenditure decentralization are a serious concern.197 Even if demand
for governmental benefits is relatively elastic and local preferences
are uniform, uniform benefits may still cause welfare losses when
there are significant regional variations in the marginal cost of provid-
ing those benefits.198 For those reasons, traditional fiscal federalism
scholarship generally endorses expenditure decentralization. That, in
turn, leads to support for decentralized taxation.
Although the proposal would centralize taxation, it would not alter
the United States’ current approach of mixing centralized and decen-
tralized governmental expenditures because the unconditional inter-
governmental transfers used to shift federal tax revenue to the states
would leave each state free to tailor the governmental benefits it pro-
193. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1122.
194. Under this line of reasoning, the perfect government would maximize overall wel-
fare by delivering customized governmental benefits to each resident that exactly
align with that resident’s preferences. Of course, as a practical matter such a
government would be unworkable.
195. Wallace E. Oates, On the Welfare Gains from Fiscal Decentralization, 2–3 J. PUB.
FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 83, 83 (1997) [hereinafter Oates, Welfare Gains].
196. Id. at 84–86.
197. Oates, Essay, supra note 5, at 1122 (recognizing that preferences and cost differ-
entials must be considered when adjusting governmental benefits to maximize
overall social welfare).
198. Oates, Welfare Gains, supra note 195, at 86–89.
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vides to local preferences. That result should be true regardless of
whether the transferred tax revenue exceeds or falls short of what the
state needs to provide those benefits because the state would retain
the ability to fine tune its revenue by raising the taxes that remain
under its control (e.g., real property taxes) or distributing the unused
excess amounts to its residents. The net effect of those features some-
what weakens traditional fiscal federalism’s decentralization objection
to the proposal.
Perhaps more importantly, the welfare-maximization argument
favoring expenditure decentralization loses much of its potency when
the localized variations in preferences for governmental benefits, and
in the marginal cost of those benefits, are arguably just as present at
the state level as they are at the federal level. For example, the local-
ized governmental benefits provided by the State of California reflect
a blend of approximately 39.1 million different individual preferences,
which is only slightly more likely to accurately reflect the views of in-
dividual Californians than the benefits that would have been provided
by the United States (a population of approximately 321 million).199
Arguably, regional variations in residents’ preferences within the
states dwarf any differences between those states and the United
States as a whole. In particular, the division between benefit prefer-
ences and the cost of acquiring those benefits is larger between high-
density urbanites and low-density rural denizens.200 In the absence of
neatly concentrated clusters of like-minded residents that happen to
align nicely with the jurisdictions of the state governments that are
making localized governmental-benefit decisions affecting those re-
199. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION: APRIL 1,
2010 TO JULY 1, 2015 (2017), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/
searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t (follow the link to the Bureau’s website and copy
and paste the “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July
1, 2015” into the search bar) [hereinafter ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT
POPULATION].
200. See Jack Healy, Fed Up on the Prairie, and Voting on Seceding from Colorado,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/us/fed-up-on-
the-prairie-and-voting-on-seceding-from-colorado.html?_r=0 [https://perma.unl
.edu/6FEM-TGVY] (telling the story of eleven low-density, rural counties in Colo-
rado who took steps to secede from the rest of the state to form “a prairie bulwark
against the demographic changes and urbanization that are reshaping politics
and life across [Colorado] and other Western states”); Claire Cain Miller, Liberals
Turn to Cities to Pass Laws and Spread Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2016, at A3,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-to-cities-to-pass-laws-
and-spread-ideas.html [https://perma.unl.edu/T9CD-U7XA] (reporting on the po-
litical and legal tensions between state governments, which must answer to ur-
ban and rural voters, and local urban governments because “[t]he demographics
of big urban centers [are] often more liberal and diverse than other parts of the
country”). It goes without saying that the costs of providing many governmental
benefits, like clean water, electricity, police, and firefighting, are lower per capita
in denser areas.
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sidents, decentralization benefits will decrease because preferences
measured at the state level should not vary much from the national
average. Certainly, any improvement in fit gained by shifting expendi-
ture authority from the federal level to the states cannot be sufficient
on its own to justify the economic efficiency, fairness, and administra-
tive-complexity costs that accompany decentralized taxation.
Increased governmental experimentation is another benefit that
many fiscal federalists assert to support decentralized expenditure au-
thority.201 The idea here is that a group of state governments indepen-
dently working on the same set of societal problems should find an
optimal solution more quickly because the states can carry out a di-
verse set of experiments in parallel.202 The development of Massachu-
setts’ health-insurance reform after a number of failed attempts by
various other state governments, and its subsequent spread through-
out the United States in the Affordable Care Act, is a recent, promi-
nent example of this federalism benefit.203 Although in principle the
federal government could accomplish the same result by engaging in a
coordinated experimental study that varies governmental approaches
to a particular problem on a state-by-state basis, that approach would
likely be politically untenable because it would require the federal
government to forcibly assign long-shot solutions to particular areas of
the country. For that reason, decentralized expenditure authority is
probably the only practical means of obtaining this diversification
benefit. Because the proposal would not prevent the states from exer-
cising control of their governmental expenditures, and the states
would have some ability to raise tax revenue using real property
taxes, the benefits of laboratory federalism should not be lost.
The same independent control over governmental benefit expendi-
tures that drives laboratory federalism allows the states to compete
with each other for businesses and residents.204 Many fiscal federalist
scholars believe that that intergovernmental competition among the
states encourages them to optimize the combination of taxes and gov-
ernmental benefits that they offer to mobile businesses and individu-
201. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 74, at 12–13.
202. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously explained this federalism bene-
fit in 1932: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
203. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2481–82 (2015) (recounting how the Affordable
Care Act “grew out of a long history of failed health insurance reform” at the state
level and how Massachusetts finally developed the state-level program that pro-
vided a template for federal legislation).
204. For a general economic discussion of tax competition and its benefits, see John
Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 269 (1999).
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als for fear of losing them.205 Other scholars view that competition as
a vital restraint on the creation of a Leviathan-sized government built
to serve the needs of the politicians who run it instead of the welfare of
its residents.206 Regardless of how one describes the main benefits de-
rived from intergovernmental competition, those benefits are only pre-
sent if alternative governmental options exist, most businesses and
individuals accurately assess the mix of taxes and governmental bene-
fits that each government offers, and those businesses and individuals
are able to move between government jurisdictions without incurring
significant transaction costs.207 While the current decentralization of
taxing power does provide more opportunities for tax competition
among alternative governments than would the proposed centraliza-
tion approach, that fact is of little consequence if the remaining two
conditions are not met as well. Arguably, they are not.
The fiscal federalism arguments in favor of decentralized govern-
ment generally assume that residents are better able to properly as-
sess and monitor the relative taxes and governmental benefits offered
by their governments when both are handled at the local level because
the connection between those taxes and the resulting benefits should
be easier for the residents to perceive.208 Undoubtedly, that is true of
benefit taxes that are directly tied to the programs they fund because
205. Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 354 (2005) (explaining how mobile residents may grav-
itate toward the mix of taxes and governmental benefits that suits them, which is
only possible when there is variation among governmental offerings); see also
McLure, Tax Assignment, supra note 175, at 627 (“Competition in the supply of
public services and in taxation disciplines politicians and bureaucrats . . . to pro-
vide the services citizens want.”).
206. Liberati, supra note 172, at 375–76 (explaining how proponents of this theory of
competitive federalism view “the central government [as] a monopolistic revenue-
maximizing Leviathan, which exploits scarce mobility of tax bases at a national
level”).
207. The classic formulation of this competition is known as the Tiebout model after
its originator. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956). In the Tiebout model, individuals reveal their preferences
for taxes and governmental benefits when they choose where to live. Id. at 419.
The individuals are assumed to have perfect information about each govern-
ment’s approach to taxation and benefits, and are able to move between jurisdic-
tions without incurring any costs. Id. Furthermore, the model assumes that they
cannot take advantage of benefits provided by a neighboring government. Id.
Under those conditions, providing smaller governmental units would allow indi-
viduals to geographically sort themselves into homogenous groups with shared
preferences. Id. at 420. Thus, according to the Tiebout model, more decentralized
state-level taxation and governmental benefits should be superior to their cen-
tralized counterparts.
208. Ter-Minassian, supra note 65, at 8 (claiming that arrangements that pair cen-
tralized taxation with decentralized expenditures “obscure the link between the
benefits of public expenditures and their price, namely, the taxes levied to fi-
nance them”).
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the taxpayer must decide whether to incur the benefit tax by partici-
pating in the governmental program. However, most federal and state
taxes are nonbenefit taxes that fund unrelated programs, making the
state tax–benefit connection that residents are supposed to perceive
tenuous at best.209
Focusing strictly on the taxation side of the states’ fiscal equations,
it seems unrealistic to assume that many residents have an accurate
picture of the extent of their individual contributions to their state’s
tax revenue.210 While some taxes that residents pay directly to their
state government in one or two lump sums each year are highly sali-
ent (e.g., real property taxes), others are much less noticeable because
they are indirectly collected through withholding agents in small in-
crements (e.g., sales taxes, payroll taxes, and individual income
taxes). As Table 1 demonstrates, the vast majority of state tax revenue
comes from the latter, less salient, types of taxes. Corporate income
taxes suffer from a different problem—even if the amount of income
taxes that a state collects from a corporation is known to its residents,
those residents have little hope of accurately assessing the impact of
those taxes because experts are not certain who ultimately bears this
tax cost (e.g., employees or shareholders).211 Faced with these difficul-
ties, the argument that decentralized taxation at the state level is
somehow easier for residents to properly assess and monitor than cen-
tralized federal taxation withers. Indeed, one could argue that easily
quantifiable intergovernmental transfers from the federal government
to a state would actually increase that state’s residents’ ability to
monitor whether the state is efficiently and effectively delivering a de-
sirable mix of governmental benefits using the resources available to
209. See supra Table 1 (showing that only a tiny percentage of the federal, state, and
local taxes for fiscal year 2015 were benefit taxes).
210. A similar problem arises with respect to residents’ abilities to accurately value
governmental benefits. In some cases, direct benefits like police protection or the
ability to drive on government-provided roads are so commonplace that they are
overlooked. Furthermore, because they are shared, it is often difficult to assign
an individual value to them that one can use to compare to one’s taxes. Then
there are positive externalities, like the educated citizenry created by public edu-
cation, that indirectly benefit all of us in ways that are almost impossible to as-
sign a specific value to. Because these valuation difficulties are present
regardless of whether the benefits involved are provided using federal- or state-
level taxes, they are not relevant when comparing the current fiscal system with
the proposed one.
211. For a sampling of the tax incidence literature dealing with corporate income
taxes, see, for example, Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Re-
view of What We Know, 20 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2006); Jane G. Gravelle, Corpo-
rate Income Tax: Incidence, Economic Effects, and Structural Issues, in TAX
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VOLUME IN MEMORY OF RICHARD MUSGRAVE 355
(John G. Head & Richard Krever eds., 2009); Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence
of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962).
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it.212 Certainly, it would be no worse than the currently available ap-
proach of evaluating a state’s performance using its total tax-revenue
data.
That said, a fiscal system that relies on federal taxes to fund state-
provided governmental benefits could still interfere with the accurate
assessment of whether a state’s mix of taxes and governmental bene-
fits aligns with its residents’ preferences for each by creating the per-
ception that the benefits are paid for using taxes paid by out-of-state
taxpayers. For residents in some states, that perception would be real-
ity if the allocation method used to divide the total federal intergov-
ernmental transfer amount among the states is not the relative total
tax revenue paid by residents of each state.213 Whether the perception
is true or not, the resulting free-rider problem in states where it is
widely believed would inflate demand for governmental benefits,
which would in turn undermine assessment of the state’s performance
satisfying its residents’ preferences. Arguably, the free-rider problem
could also contribute to the creation of the Leviathan-sized govern-
ments that some fiscal federalist scholars believe will arise in the ab-
sence of intergovernmental competition among the states.
Even if alternative state government options exist, and most busi-
nesses and individuals are able to accurately assess the mix of taxes
and governmental benefits that each government offers, intergovern-
mental competition among the states will not yield many benefits if
those businesses and individuals are unable to move between govern-
ment jurisdictions without incurring significant transaction costs.
Without that low-cost mobility, unhappy residents whose preferences
regarding taxes and benefits are disregarded, perhaps by politicians
exploiting their power within the state government to substitute their
own preferences for those of their constituents, will not be able to re-
ject that undesirable tax and benefit mix by relocating. Given the con-
siderable hurdles that typically accompany an interstate move (e.g.,
finding a new job, buying and selling houses, leaving friends and ac-
quaintances, relocating business operations), intergovernmental com-
petition among the states is not likely to yield the hoped-for optimized
212. Note that, under the proposal, benefit taxes and one of the most salient nonbene-
fit taxes—real property taxes—will remain at the state level.
213. Of course, interstate redistribution of this sort already occurs in the U.S. system.
See John Tierney, Which States Are Givers and Which Are Takers? And Is That
Even the Correct Way to Frame the Question?, THE ATLANTIC, May 5, 2014, http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/which-states-are-givers-and-
which-are-takers/361668 [https://perma.unl.edu/3H7K-CDUA] (reporting that
federal government spending per dollar of federal taxes in 2014 ranged from
$7.87 for South Carolina to approximately $0.50 for Delaware).
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combination of taxes and governmental benefits or to restrain the cre-
ation of a Leviathan-sized government.214
Of course, unhappy residents could try to achieve those two goals,
without moving, by voting for politicians that actually deliver the re-
sidents’ optimized combination of taxes and governmental benefits.
There are two obvious problems with the voting solution as an alter-
native to actual relocation. First, the relocating resident can improve
upon her mix of taxes and governmental benefits without the ap-
proval, or even agreement, of her fellow residents by moving to an al-
ready-existing alternative that is more to her liking. The voting
resident cannot unilaterally achieve a similar improvement and may
find that the more localized elections at the state level are no easier to
influence than the federal ones because, either way, she is merely one
voter among millions of others who do not share all of her prefer-
ences.215 Second, while intergovernmental competition among the
states would not directly aid these immobile voters, the ability to ob-
serve alternative approaches carried out in other states might indi-
rectly aid them by helping them identify potentially superior options
that they could push their states to adopt. This indirect aid is nothing
more than the laboratory federalism concept discussed above.216
Finally, it is also worth noting that, as with laboratory federalism,
the proposed combination of centralized taxation and decentralized
governmental expenditures would not eliminate intergovernmental
competition benefits because states could still adopt a unique blend of
government benefits and real property taxes, and use that blend to
attract businesses that are considering relocation. Nevertheless, much
of the interstate tax competition that exists under the current system
would be lost with the consolidation of taxing power at the federal
level. Indeed, reducing that economically inefficient competition,
which often sacrifices overall welfare at the national level for localized
214. Despite the public perception of Americans being always on the move, in reality
“fewer and fewer Americans are loading up the moving van in search of opportu-
nity.” Patricia Cohen, Fewer Americans Strike Out for New Jobs, Crimping the
Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2016, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/
business/economy/fewer-workers-choose-to-move-to-new-pastures.html?_r=0. If
residents will not move in pursuit of jobs, which yield a concrete and direct bene-
fit to them, they are not likely to move to capture less direct, less tangible bene-
fits like a better suited mix of taxes and governmental benefits.
215. See ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION, supra note 199 and accom-
panying text (comparing an individual’s voting power in California and in the
United States).
216. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (concluding that laboratory feder-
alism would not be compromised under the proposed solution to the tax-assign-
ment problem).
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economic gain in a particular state, is one of the main reasons for cen-
tralizing taxes.217
3. Behavioral Economics and the Benefits of Interstate
Governmental Competition
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the most common and
strongest arguments against centralized taxation assume that the
choices created by interstate governmental competition lead to better
alignment between residents’ preferences and the actions of their gov-
ernment. That critical assumption depends, in turn, on three other
assumptions—(1) that the residents will dutifully gather all the rele-
vant information necessary to evaluate the various governments’ tax
and benefit offerings, (2) that the residents are able to accurately as-
sess how their government’s tax and benefit decisions match up
against those offered by other governments, and (3) that the residents
will act on that information in a rational manner. Unfortunately,
these latter assumptions are belied by advances in the field of behav-
ioral economics.
Although behavioral economics’ development as a subfield of eco-
nomics is relatively recent, it fits comfortably within the commonly
accepted broad definition of economics as “the science which studies
human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses.”218 Behavioral economics deviates from
traditional economics by rejecting economic-utility theory as the sole
“normative model of rational choice” describing human economic be-
havior.219 Instead of assuming “a world populated by calculating,
unemotional maximizers” who are perfectly rational in their pursuit of
ever-greater utility,220 behavioral economists take into account the
real-world limitations affecting human decision-making that effec-
tively prevent those humans from achieving perfect rationality.221 At
least three of those decision-making limitations are relevant when as-
217. See supra notes 120–27 and accompanying text (outlining the inefficient eco-
nomic and political distortions that result from interstate tax competition and tax
misalignments among the states).
218. LIONEL C. ROBBINS, ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCI-
ENCE 15 (1932). Although the quoted language is a commonly accepted definition,
there are many others. See Roger E. Backhouse & Steven G. Medema, On the
Definition of Economics, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 221–22 (2009) (listing numer-
ous, and varying, textbook definitions).
219. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
220. Richard H. Thaler & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Behavioral Economics Differs
from Traditional Economics, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., http://www.econlib
.org/library/Enc/BehavioralEconomics.html [https://perma.unl.edu/EE8R-C4H6].
221. THALER, supra note 4, at 9 (“[Behavioral economics] is still economics, but it is
economics done with strong injections of good psychology and other social
sciences.”).
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sessing the validity of the assumptions that underlie the claimed ben-
efits of interstate governmental competition.
Daniel Kahneman, winner of the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize for
Economic Sciences for his foundational work on behavioral economics,
refers to the first relevant decision-making limitation as “WYSIATI,”
or “what you see is all there is.”222 Unlike traditional economics’ ra-
tional maximizers, who meticulously gather all the relevant informa-
tion necessary to make a utility-maximizing decision, actual humans
tend to make decisions using the WYSIATI assumption.223 Obviously,
that WYSIATI approach violates the first underlying assumption out-
lined above—that the residents will dutifully gather all the relevant
information necessary to evaluate the various governments’ tax and
benefit offerings. Residents’ choices that are based on incomplete in-
formation are less likely to result in better alignment between re-
sidents’ preferences and the actions of their government.
Kahneman attributes the WYSIATI tendency to the division of
mental work between two distinct modes of thought that he and other
psychologists have labeled “System 1” and “System 2.” System 1
thinking involuntarily occurs automatically and is impulsive, intui-
tive, and associative in nature. System 2 thinking requires concen-
trated effort and relies on logic and reason. It is “the conscious,
reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to
think about and what to do.”224 In many ways, System 2 thinking is
the rational maximizer that economic utility theory assumes drives
human behavior. Unfortunately, humans are naturally lazy when it
comes to System 2 thinking, leaving System 1 thinking often driving
the bus.225 System 1 thinking’s dominance is obvious when we make
impulsive, intuitive decisions based on limited information. But, it has
almost as much influence when we engage in more controlled System
2 thinking because it “effortlessly originat[es the] impressions and
feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate
choices” shaping our System 2 thinking.226 Whether we like it or not,
System 1 thinking is quite influential.
The WYSIATI decision-making limitation is a direct result of Sys-
tem 1 thinking. By its very nature, associative thinking can only work
222. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 85–86 (2011).
223. Despite the problems that WYSIATI decision-making creates for economic-utility
theory, it is not actually irrational human behavior. Rather, the reliance on in-
complete information and use of heuristics make perfect sense when confronted
with humankind’s “bounded rationality” (i.e., its “lack of cognitive ability to solve
complex problems”). THALER, supra note 4, at 23. Before the rise of behavioral
economics, traditional economics simply “brushed aside bounded rationality as a
‘true but unimportant’ concept” and assumed rationality was unbounded. Id.
224. KAHNEMAN, supra note 222, at 21.
225. Id. at 44–46.
226. Id. at 21.
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with activated information and ideas when constructing a coherent
narrative or line of reasoning.227 For that reason, System 1 thinking
barely notices when the conclusions it reaches for complex problems
are based on insufficient or low-quality data.228 When a resident must
decide whether the current government’s tax and benefit offerings are
sufficiently aligned with the resident’s preferences, System 1 thinking
is likely to limit the resident’s analysis to the readily available infor-
mation, without further data gathering, if a coherent answer is possi-
ble using that information. That the unknown data might invalidate
the resident’s analysis and conclusions will not matter. In that way,
the resident’s reliance on System 1 thinking, and the WYSIATI limita-
tion that results, undercuts traditional fiscal federalism’s argument in
favor of interstate governmental competition.
System 1 thinking is also responsible for substitution, the second
relevant decision-making limitation that calls into question the value
of the choices created by interstate governmental competition. Substi-
tution occurs when we respond to a hard, target question that is not
readily answerable by replacing it with a related, heuristic question
that is easier to solve.229 According to Kahneman, humans easily fall
into substitution because our lazy brains seek to avoid the onerous
System 2 thinking necessary to tackle the target question.230 Instead,
our brains use System 1 thinking to helpfully generate a heuristic
question that is related to the difficult target question and may pro-
duce an approximate answer to it.231 If needed, more System 1 think-
ing closes the loop by matching the intensity of the answer to the
heuristic question with the range of possible answers to the more diffi-
cult target question.232 The end result is a readily available heuristic
answer that seems to resolve the difficult target question and, if that
answer is then endorsed by lazy System 2 thinking, may be used with-
out much rational thought regarding whether the answer is appropri-
227. Id. at 85.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 97.
230. Id. The situation is actually worse than it appears. Not only do we resist burden-
some System 2 thinking, the cognitive ease afforded by System 1 thinking actu-
ally feels good! Id. at 65–67.
231. Id. at 97–98.
232. Id. at 99. A straightforward example is useful for understanding how the two
steps function. When confronted with the difficult question of “How much would
you contribute to save an endangered species?” you might substitute the heuristic
question “How much emotion do I feel when I think of dying dolphins?” in its
place. Armed with your easily determined emotional attitude toward dying dol-
phins, System 1 thinking easily maps the intensity of your response to a dollar
amount that feels comparable. Id. at 98–99.
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ate for the target question.233 Often, the person involved may not even
realize that the actual target question raised was not addressed.234
In the context of evaluating the benefits derived from the choices
created by interstate governmental competition, the target question
confronting residents is whether their government’s tax and benefit
decisions are better or worse than those offered by other governments.
Unfortunately, producing a well-reasoned answer to that complex
question requires the sort of difficult, critical analysis that our lazy
brains seek to avoid through substitution. Most residents are likely to
come up with an easier, heuristic question that System 1 thinking can
readily answer. Some possibilities include: “Which state’s governor
looks more competent?” or “Which state handles the current hot issue
better (e.g., transgender bathroom issues)?”235 Whatever the resi-
dent’s substituted heuristic question, unless the resident is quite vigi-
lant, the comparative evaluation of state policies will stop there.
Needless to say, if residents do not actually attempt to accurately as-
sess how their government’s tax and benefit decisions match up
against those offered by other governments, then the presence of in-
terstate governmental competition will not necessarily lead to im-
proved alignment between residents’ preferences and the actions of
their government. Sadly, behavioral economics’ findings regarding the
impact of substitution on human decision-making give little reason to
believe that many residents engage in that sort of methodical analy-
sis. For that reason, the second assumption underlying the benefits of
interstate governmental competition—that the residents involved will
be able to accurately compare their government’s tax and benefit deci-
sions with those offered by other governments—also fails.
The third underlying assumption suffers the same fate. Even if re-
sidents gathered all the relevant information and performed the re-
quired comparisons, behavioral economics’ endowment effect will
likely prevent those residents from acting on that information in a ra-
tional manner. A person’s endowment is the physical and intangible
stuff that person owns. The endowment effect recognizes that people
assign greater value to an item when they own it than they do when
233. Id. at 99.
234. Id.
235. Not only are these heuristic questions much easier to intuitively answer, they are
also appealing to a brain engaged in System 1 thinking because they deal with
highly salient issues or people who are most likely to be covered by the media and
readily come to mind in connection with state governments. WYSIATI, yet again.
Id. at 85–86. Another possible heuristic question that is only loosely related to
the governmental taxes and benefits present in the target question is “How
happy/successful am I living in my current state?” The intensity of the answer to
that question is easily matched to the state government’s contribution toward
that level of happiness or success. In other words, if a person is doing very well in
a state, then the state must also be doing very well.
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they are considering acquiring it.236 Put differently, “we are driven
more strongly to avoid losses than to achieve gains.”237 Studies indi-
cate that people assign twice the weight to a loss as that they do an
equivalent gain.238
The endowment effect and the resulting asymmetric treatment of
gains and losses can heavily influence decision-making. Our “[l]oss
aversion is a powerful conservative force that favors minimal changes
from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and individu-
als.”239 That strong status-quo bias means that residents will hold on
to their current bundle of governmental taxes and benefits long after
the rational maximizer of traditional economic theory would have
jumped to a different jurisdiction where the government’s policies bet-
ter fit the resident’s preferences. Loss-averse residents may eventu-
ally consider moving when they perceive the gain from acquiring
another state’s better-aligned mix of taxes and benefits significantly
outweighs the associated loss from foregoing the mix provided by their
current state. However, the benefits derived from that interstate gov-
ernmental competition are considerably less than are often assumed
by fiscal federalists under the traditional economic theory because of
the endowment effect.
Taken together, WYSIATI, substitution, and the endowment effect
effectively undercut the three assumptions that fiscal federalists use
to support their overarching belief that interstate governmental com-
petition necessarily leads to better alignment between residents’ pref-
erences and the actions of their government. In fact, the WYSIATI
limitation causes residents not to bother gathering the relevant infor-
mation necessary to evaluate the various governments’ tax and bene-
fit offerings. Substitution causes the residents to avoid a methodical
comparison of those alternative offerings by diverting them toward
easier-to-answer heuristic questions. And, even if WYSIATI and sub-
stitution are avoided, the residents’ inherent loss aversion from the
endowment effect will cause them to maintain the status quo much
longer than they should if the asserted interstate governmental bene-
fits are to be realized. In short, behavioral economics’ more nuanced
understanding of how people make decisions significantly weakens, or
even eliminates, the most common and strongest arguments against
centralized taxation. Once those arguments are largely neutralized,
the remaining tax-specific and tax-coordination fiscal federalism con-
236. THALER, supra note 4, at 18.
237. KAHNEMAN, supra note 222, at 302.
238. Id. at 296 (summarizing the results from “studies of diverse economic domains”)
(“[I]n contrast to the predictions of economic theory, the effect of price increases
(losses relative to the reference price) is about twice as large as the effect of
gains.”); THALER, supra note 4, at 59 (“Losses hurt about twice as much as gains
make us feel good.”).
239. KAHNEMAN, supra note 222, at 305.
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siderations discussed above, which generally support centralized taxa-
tion, amount to a strong argument in favor of this Article’s proposed
answer to the tax-assignment problem.
IV. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Whatever the merits of arguments promoting decentralized inter-
state governmental competition, centralized uniformity has its bene-
fits when it comes to taxation. Not surprisingly, tax law and fiscal
federalism scholars have occasionally championed taxation ap-
proaches aimed at increasing uniformity. This Part briefly describes
two of the more common recommendations involving multistate busi-
ness income and compares them to this Article’s proposed solution to
the tax-assignment problem.
A. Uniform Taxpayer Nexus and Apportionment
A recent law review article by Quinn Ryan proposed increasing in-
come tax uniformity by having the federal government “establish[ ] a
nationwide standard for income tax jurisdiction based on economic
presence, coupled with the imposition of a uniform method of income
apportionment.”240 Ryan’s proposal was prompted, in part, by Con-
gress’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to pass various versions of the
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act (“BATSA”).241 The BATSAs
would have forced states to use a uniform physical-presence jurisdic-
tion test without imposing uniform income apportionment.242 Ryan’s
two-pronged proposal would leave intact the states’ lack of uniformity
on tax base and tax rates. It was also largely silent on tax-administra-
tion consolidation.
Although the partial state-tax alignment resulting from Ryan’s
proposal would be an improvement over the status quo, the problems
it would leave unaddressed are still formidable. For example, the
states’ use of different tax bases would still create unnecessary rules-
complexity compliance costs.243 Misalignment among the states’ tax
bases would also leave intact the possibility that part of a multistate
business’s tax base would unintentionally escape taxation entirely or
be taxed multiple times.244 Furthermore, state control over tax base
and, in particular, tax rates would encourages states to continue com-
240. Quinn T. Ryan, Comment, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About State Corpo-
rate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2010).
241. Id. at 277.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (explaining how the current tax
system’s patchwork approach creates rules-complexity costs).
244. See supra notes 126–30, 145 and accompanying text (describing the inefficient
behavioral distortions resulting from unintentional misalignment of the states’
tax systems).
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peting for economic development using tax incentives.245 Thus, Ryan’s
proposal fails to eliminate the economically inefficient behavioral dis-
tortions present in the current system and the transactional-complex-
ity costs those distortions create. Tax-base and tax-rate variations
also leave open the possibility of horizontal- and vertical-equity viola-
tions.246 Finally, the continued existence of fifty-one tax administra-
tions operating in parallel does little to reduce compliance
complexity.247
Those significant costs would be justified if the non-uniform tax
bases and tax rates causing them were necessary to achieve larger
compensating benefits. Unfortunately, they are not. At most, Ryan’s
proposal reduces the likelihood of constitutional challenge by leaving
states in charge of most aspects of their tax systems248 and leaves
intact the dubious benefits of interstate governmental competition.249
Although those benefits have some value, they do not justify the non-
uniformity costs embedded in Ryan’s proposal because an alternative
approach exists in the literature that eliminates many of those costs
without foregoing either benefit.
B. Full Uniformity Except Tax Rates
In his assessment of Ryan’s proposed multistate business income-
tax system, Charles McLure endorsed the proposal’s uniform jurisdic-
tional standard and apportionment method.250 But, McLure implied
that the proposal did not go far enough toward uniformity when he
noted that his “ideal system” would also have uniform “definition[s] of
the potential taxpayer” (e.g., separate legal entities or combined
group) and the “income that is potentially subject to tax.”251 Taken
together, McLure’s four uniformities would create a uniform tax base
245. See supra notes 120–25, 141–44 and accompanying text (recounting the efficiency
and transaction costs connected to the states’ pursuit of economic development
using tax incentives and of the taxpayers’ pursuit of those tax incentives).
246. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (exploring the horizontal and ver-
tical equity problems created by the current tax system).
247. See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text (outlining the substantial aggre-
gate compliance costs shouldered by taxpayers and tax administrators under the
current tax system).
248. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text (discussing the federalism-based
constitutional argument against Congress possessing the ability to completely
preempt the states’ taxing power).
249. See supra notes 201–07 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of labora-
tory federalism and the restraints that proponents of interstate competition ar-
gue prevent politicians from subverting the government’s proper role to benefit
themselves).
250. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Difficulty of Getting Serious About State Corporate
Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327, 329–30 (2010) [hereinafter McLure,
The Difficulty].
251. Id. at 328–30.
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for each taxpayer that the states would divide among themselves us-
ing a uniform set of rules. Those commonly applied apportionment
rules would ensure that all income is exposed to taxation in only one
state. Only the tax rates applied to that apportioned tax base would
vary among the states. If a state chose not to tax income, it could set
the tax rate to zero. McLure’s full-uniformity-except-tax-rates ap-
proach is arguably the best alternative to this Article’s proposed solu-
tion to the tax-assignment problem.252
The full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach has a storied history
that was well established at least fifty years ago when the Special
Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary issued State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
(the “Willis Report”).253 The Willis Report recommended a number of
substantive and procedural changes that “essentially eliminated di-
versity in state corporate income taxes, except with regard to
rates.”254 That general approach was also championed by Daniel
Shaviro, a prominent tax-law scholar, in 1992.255 More recently,
McLure has discussed its merits on numerous occasions.256 Propo-
nents of the full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach assert that ex-
tending uniformity to tax rates goes too far because the costs of doing
so purportedly outweigh the accompanying benefits.257
As with Ryan’s two-pronged proposal, the main benefits achieved
by leaving states in control of tax rates are a reduced likelihood of
successful constitutional challenge and the benefits derived from in-
terstate governmental competition. Regarding the former, the main
constitutional concern with a federally imposed uniform tax system is
that it would be equivalent to destroying the states’ sovereignty by
denying them revenue-raising autonomy.258 Permitting the states to
retain control over tax rates empowers them to select which types of
252. McLure did not select a particular method for attaining his ideal system. Instead,
he noted that either multilateral action from the states or federal action would
work, but that neither was likely to happen any time soon. Id. at 335–39.
253. H.R. REP. NO. 89–952 (1965).
254. McLure, The Difficulty, supra note 250, at 336.
255. Shaviro, supra note 50, at 897.
256. McLure, Tax Assignment, supra note 175, at 627–28; McLure, The Difficulty,
supra note 250, at 328; McLure, The Nuttiness, supra note 41, at 843.
257. See McLure, The Nuttiness, supra note 41, at 843 (“There is generally no persua-
sive case for requiring uniformity of tax rates, which eliminates subnational fis-
cal autonomy, as well as any possibility of tax competition, without much
affecting complexity.”); see also Shaviro, supra note 50, at 897, 985 (“In addition
to being relatively unnecessary, constraining tax rate variations plainly would
move closer to the point where the costs of increased uniformity begin to exceed
the benefits.”).
258. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text (discussing the federalism-based
constitutional argument against Congress possessing the ability to completely
preempt the states’ taxing power).
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taxes to use in their pursuit of revenue and how much to use them.259
As Shaviro noted when analyzing whether the Constitution permits
Congress to adopt the full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach, “[a]s
a practical matter . . . there may be outside limits . . . on how far
Congress can go in the state and local tax area” but that “addressing
coordination problems between states’ tax systems and conforming tax
bases to reduce burdens on interstate commerce . . . should be well
within any such limits.”260 Put differently, state control over tax rates
should effectively eliminate any concern that the federal government’s
imposition of an otherwise uniform tax system upon the states vio-
lates the federalism structure built into the Constitution. For that rea-
son, the full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach should be preferred
over the proposal in this Article if the Supreme Court rejects the con-
stitutional viability analysis in section II.C. Of course, constitutional
arguments in favor of leaving control of tax rates with the states lose
their force if the Supreme Court holds that the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses elevate Congress’s responsibility for regulating
the national economy above the states’ ability to raise revenue using
one or more specific taxes.
The second argument for leaving states in control of setting tax
rates is that the resulting interstate governmental competition im-
proves government. In McLure’s words, “[c]ompetition in the supply of
public services and in taxation disciplines politicians and bureaucrats
to be efficient and to provide the services citizens want.”261 These two
competition benefits—restraint on politicians’ tendencies to build a
Leviathan-sized government that serves them instead of their constit-
uents and improved alignment between government’s activities and
its residents’ preferences—were discussed in detail in subsection
III.B.2.262 As noted there, and in subsection III.B.3, there are good
reasons to question whether either benefit is really significant in light
of the difficulty residents have in accurately assessing whether the
mix of taxes and governmental benefits offered by competing states
and the hurdles they face changing state governments in the event
that a competitor is deemed to be better. Limiting interstate govern-
mental competition to one area—tax rates—does simplify the re-
sidents’ assessment task by focusing it on one salient set of numbers
259. As noted earlier, a state can choose not to use a particular type of tax (e.g., the
corporate income tax) by setting the relevant tax rate to zero.
260. Shaviro, supra note 50, at 988.
261. McLure, Tax Assignment, supra note 175, at 627; see also McLure, The Nuttiness,
supra note 41, at 843 (“Tax competition among states can be beneficial, by pro-
tecting taxpayers from the tendency of politicians to levy taxes that exceed bene-
fits provided to taxpayers.”).
262. See supra notes 206–17 and accompanying text (raising and refuting the main
alleged benefits of interstate governmental competition).
2017] ONE TAX TO RULE THEM ALL 59
that are readily comparable among the states.263 However, to compare
state taxation systems residents will still need to translate those tax
rates into tax payments using the various tax bases employed by the
competing states (e.g., property values for property taxes and total an-
nual purchases for sales taxes). The relative size of the various tax
bases for each resident will determine which tax-rate comparisons are
most important for that resident. Thus, the actual comparisons, while
simplified, will still be more than many residents can handle. Many
will fall prey to WYSIATI by focusing exclusively on the tax rates
themselves, without regard to the relative weights each should be
given,264 or to question substitution that allows them to avoid the dif-
ficult target comparison.265 In addition, the endowment effect will dis-
tort their decisions in favor of the status quo, which should weaken
the competition’s ability to impact government.266 In the end, narrow-
ing the scope of interstate governmental competition to tax rates miti-
gates, but does not eliminate, the reasons why intergovernmental
competition among the states is not likely to yield the hoped-for opti-
mized combination of taxes and governmental benefits or to restrain
the creation of a Leviathan-sized government.
Interstate governmental competition using tax rates has its down-
sides, too. Most importantly, states can continue using tax incentives
to compete for mobile economic development opportunities. As a re-
sult, the full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach preserves some of
the economically inefficient behavioral distortions present in the cur-
rent system. Multistate businesses that contort themselves in pursuit
of those state tax savings will continue to experience transactional-
complexity costs. Furthermore, the varying taxes and tax rates may
lead to horizontal- and vertical-equity violations when multistate
businesses face differing state tax landscapes. Thus, limiting state
control over taxation to setting tax rates eliminates many, but not all,
263. See Shaviro, supra note 50, at 985 (“Issues of what type of tax to use—for exam-
ple, whether to rely on income taxes or sales taxes for revenue—tend to be more
visible and salient than the details of particular tax bases . . . .”). The tax rate
issue is functionally equivalent to deciding which type of tax to use because a
state selects a particular tax type for use by setting its tax rate to a nonzero
number.
264. See supra notes 222–28 and accompanying text (explaining how the “what you
see is all there is,” or WYSIATI, assumption spurred by System 1 thinking causes
people to make impulsive, intuitive decisions based on limited information).
265. See supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text (discussing the System 1 thinking
process that causes people to substitute an easier heuristic question for a more
complicated target question—often without realizing that the substitution
occurred).
266. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text (describing how our strong aver-
sion to losses creates an endowment effect that places outsized importance on
preserving our stuff (e.g., our set of governmental benefits) simply because it is
ours).
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of the problems present in the current system. Those that remain ar-
guably outweigh the minimal constitutional and competition advan-
tages that the full-uniformity-except-tax-rates approach has over this
Article’s proposal.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Denizens of Middle Earth rejoiced when the One Ring’s power to
find, bind, and rule them all perished in the fires of Mount Doom.267
Residents of the United States should not feel the same way about the
centralized tax system proposed here as a solution to fiscal federal-
ism’s tax-assignment problem. Creating “one tax to rule them all” by
consolidating most taxing power at the federal level and replacing
most state and local taxes with unconditional intergovernmental
transfers that are funded out of the incremental federal-level taxes
should preserve the current system’s customization benefits derived
from decentralized governmental responsibilities while shielding the
states’ provision of governmental benefits from localized economic
ebbs and flows.
More importantly, the proposed centralized tax system would cap-
ture significant new uniformity benefits. As the discussion in this Ar-
ticle demonstrates, the proper assignment of taxes among the federal
government and the fifty state governments is largely driven by the
tradeoff between the benefits of having a uniform tax system and
those created by interstate governmental competition in a decentral-
ized system. Increased uniformity should improve the efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and fairness of the overall tax system. Increased inter-
state governmental competition is believed to promote improved align-
ment between residents’ preferences and the actions of their
government.
Unfortunately, the benefits of interstate governmental competition
are mostly a mirage because the conditions necessary for them to be
realized do not exist. Behavioral economics has demonstrated that the
world is not populated by the rational maximizers who would be re-
sponsible for turning interstate governmental competition into an op-
timal mix of taxes and governmental benefits. Instead, real people
often make irrational decisions when confronted with complex issues
like the assessment of taxes and governmental benefits. Their deci-
sion-making is limited by cognitive errors like (1) assuming that “what
you see is all there is;” (2) substituting a related, but simpler, question
in place of the target question; and (3) overvaluing the status quo pro-
vided by their current state because it is part of their endowment.
This more nuanced understanding of how people make decisions sig-
267. TOLKIEN, supra note 1, at 925–26, 931–33.
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nificantly weakens, or even eliminates, interstate governmental com-
petition’s benefits.
In the end, solving fiscal federalism’s tax-assignment problem re-
quires recognizing that the uniformity benefits achieved by this Arti-
cle’s proposed solution are real and significant. They should not be
sacrificed to preserve decentralization’s largely illusory competition
benefits. Although it may be politically untenable at this time, the
United States should move toward a fiscal system built upon central-
ized taxation carried out by the federal government.
